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ALTHOUGH  CORPORATIONS  are responsible for roughly half of private 
saving  in the United States, most studies  of saving  focus exclusively on 
household behavior. Policy initiatives to increase saving have also 
concentrated  on personal saving, through  such measures  as Individual 
Retirement  Accounts and reductions in marginal  tax rates. The Tax 
Reform  Act of 1986  is likely to prove a particularly  costly example  of the 
neglect of corporate saving. The new law increases corporate taxes 
approximately  $120  billion  over the next five years and reduces the tax 
incentives for retaining  corporate  earnings. Even if it does not affect 
pretax  corporate  earnings,  it could  reduce  corporate  saving  between $30 
billion  and  $40  billion  a year by 1989. 
Whether  tax-induced  changes in corporate  saving affect the level of 
private  saving  is a central  issue in evaluating  the recent  tax reform.  Most 
theoretical  studies model household  consumption  and saving  decisions 
as  afunction  of the  private  sector's  budget  constraint,  implicitly  assuming 
that households "pierce the corporate veil" and take full account of 
corporations'  saving on their behalf. According to that view, the Tax 
Reform Act's  reallocation of  tax burdens between individuals and 
corporations  will not affect private saving. In contrast, most macro- 
econometric  models  and saving  studies  that  link consumption  decisions 
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to disposable  income and household  wealth without  any explicit recog- 
nition  of undistributed  profits  find  that  corporate  saving  does affect total 
private saving. An increase  in dividend  payments  offset by a reduction 
in  undistributed  profits,  which  raises  disposable  income  and  lowers share 
values, will reduce total private saving if the marginal  propensity to 
consume out of disposable  income  exceeds that  from  wealth. 
This paper investigates both the impact of tax policy on corporate 
saving and the effects of corporate  saving on private saving. The first 
section documents  the importance  of corporate  saving. The paper  then 
considers how the recent increase in corporate  taxes and reduction  in 
dividend  taxes will affect corporate  saving.  Time series estimates  of the 
relationship  between corporate  dividends,  after-tax  profits,  and the tax 
treatment  of dividends  suggest  a substantial  decline  in corporate  saving, 
raising  the question  whether  changes  in corporate  saving  affect  the level 
of private  saving.  The U.S. time series evidence suggests  that personal 
saving adjusts only partly to offset shifts in corporate saving. The 
movements in corporate saving induced by the Tax Reform Act are 
therefore likely to reduce private saving, although by less than the 
decline in corporate  saving. The concluding section suggests several 
directions  for future  work. 
The Importance  of Corporate Saving 
Private saving equals the sum of personal saving, or the excess of 
disposable income over personal consumption,  and corporate  saving. 
Although  the precise division of private saving into these two compo- 
nents is ambiguous,  most measures  suggest that  gross corporate  saving 
has accounted  for roughly  half of gross private  saving  during  the 1980s. 
This  section  discusses  the measurement  of corporate  saving  and  provides 
summary  statistics  on its changes  since 1950. 
MEASURING  CORPORATE  SAVING 
Gross  corporate  saving  in the National  Income  and  Product  Accounts 
(NIPA) equals undistributed  corporate  profits, while net saving equals 
undistributed  profits  less capital  consumption.  Since capital consump- 
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primarily  on net saving.1  Table 1 reports data for both gross and nlet 
private  saving  since 1950.  Net private  saving  declines dramatically  as a 
share of net national  product  during  the 1980s, although  gross private 
saving  as a share  of gross national  product  is relatively  constant. Gross 
corporate  saving  accounts  for approximately  half  of gross  private  saving 
during  the 1980s.  The corporate  share  of net saving  is somewhat  smaller  , 
about  30 percent.  Although  gross corporate  saving  accounts  for a larger 
fraction of gross national product in the 1980s than in any previous 
decade, net corporate  saving  reaches its postwar  low. It averages  only 
2.1 percent of net national product during 1980-86, down from 2.7 
percent in the  1970s and 3.8 percent in the 1960s. Since 1984, net 
corporate  saving  has returned  to its level during  the 1970s,  but it is still 
well below its 1960s  average. 
Table 1 also shows the decline in personal saving during  the 1980s.2 
Gross personal saving drops from 9.5 percent of GNP in the 1970s to 
only 8.7 percent  in the 1980s  and averages  only 7.8 percent since 1984. 
Net personal  saving declines even further,  from 6.2 percent  of NNP in 
the 1970s  to 4.8 percent  in the 1980s.  The dramatic  drop  in net personal 
saving  has increased  the relative  importance  of corporate  saving. 
Corporate  saving  includes  saving  by nonfinancial  corporations,  finan- 
cial corporations,  and foreign affiliates  of U.S.  firms. Domestic non- 
financial  corporations  have accounted for 68 percent of net corporate 
saving  during  the postwar period, although  their share has declined to 
only 58 percent during the  1980s. The two other corporate saving 
components  exhibit opposing trends. Saving by financial  corporations 
averaged  about 0.6 percent of NNP from the 1950s  through  the 1970s, 
but has decreased  to only 0.1 percent in the 1980s. In contrast, undis- 
tributed  profits  of foreign  affiliates  have become more important,  rising 
from  0.2 percent  of NNP during  the 1960s  to 0.7 percent  in the 1  980s. In 
1. Some argue  for examining  movements  in gross saving, because of potential  mea- 
surement  error  in capital  consumption.  This problem  is more  likely to arise in analyzing 
the level of private  saving than in comparing  the level at different  dates. Most of the 
changes  in capital  consumption  as a share  of NNP arise from variation  in the respective 
shares  of equipment  and structures  in the capital  stock and from  changes  in the capital- 
output  ratio.  Neither  trend  is likely  to be measured  with substantial  error. 
2. The  profits  of sole proprietorships,  partnerships,  and  other  noncorporate  businesses 
are included  in personal  saving because of the difficulties  in allocating  them between 
entrepreneurial  labor  income  and  capital  income. Table 1.  Gross and Net Saving Rates, United States, 1950-86 
Gross saving  (percent of GNP)  Net  saving  (percent of NNP) 
Year  Corporate  Personal  Private  Corporate  Personal  Private 
1950  7.1  8.3  15.4  3.1  4.8  7.9 
1951  6.9  8.9  15.8  2.9  5.4  8.3 
1952  7.1  8.9  16.0  3.0  5.4  8.3 
1953  6.7  8.9  15.6  2.5  5.4  8.0 
1954  7.2  8.5  15.8  2.9  4.8  7.7 
1955  8.2  7.9  16.1  4.0  4.3  8.3 
1956  7.8  9.1  16.8  3.3  5.5  8.7 
1957  7.8  9.1  16.9  3.0  5.5  8.5 
1958  7.4  9.5  16.9  2.4  5.9  8.3 
1959  8.2  8.4  16.6  3.5  4.8  8.3 
1960  7.7  8.0  15.7  3.0  4.4  7.4 
1961  7.7  8.6  16.3  2.9  5.1  8.0 
1962  8.3  8.3  16.6  3.8  4.9  8.7 
1963  8.4  7.7  16.1  3.9  4.4  8.4 
1964  8.6  8.5  17.1  4.2  5.3  9.5 
1965  9.1  8.4  17.4  4.8  5.3  10.1 
1966  9.0  8.1  17.0  4.7  5.1  9.8 
1967  8.6  9.0  17.6  4.2  6.0  10.2 
1968  8.1  8.2  16.3  3.6  5.2  8.8 
1969  7.5  7.9  15.4  2.9  4.8  7.6 
1970  6.9  9.3  16.2  1.9  6.2  8.2 
1971  7.6  9.7  17.3  2.6  6.6  9.3 
1972  8.0  8.8  16.8  3.1  5.6  8.6 
1973  7.7  10.2  18.0  3.0  7.2  10.1 
1974  6.8  10.5  17.3  1.5  7.2  8.7 
1975  8.4  10.6  19.0  2.6  7.3  9.9 
1976  8.6  9.4  18.0  2.9  6.0  8.9 
1977  9.2  8.6  17.8  3.5  5.1  8.6 
1978  9.2  9.0  18.2  3.4  5.5  8.7 
1979  8.8  9.0  17.8  2.8  5.3  8.0 
1980  8.0  9.5  17.5  1.6  5.6  7.2 
1981  8.3  9.7  18.0  1.6  5.9  7.5 
1982  8.1  9.5  17.6  0.7  5.5  6.2 
1983  9.0  8.4  17.4  2.2  4.3  6.5 
1984  9.2  8.8  17.9  2.7  5.0  7.8 
1985  9.4  7.8  17.2  3.0  4.0  7.0 
1986  9.3  6.9  16.1  2.9  3.0  6.0 
Averages 
1950-59  7.4  8.7  16.2  3.0  5.2  8.2 
1960-69  8.3  8.3  16.6  3.8  5.1  8.9 
1970-79  8.1  9.5  17.6  2.7  6.2  8.9 
1980-86  8.7  8.7  17.4  2.1  4.8  6.9 
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1986,  net saving  by foreign  affiliates  of U.S. firms  was nearly  one-third 
of net corporate  saving.3 
Many  questions  involving  the demarcation  of personal  and  corporate 
saving  are  difficult  to resolve, and  there  are  several  plausible  alternatives 
to the NIPA division.  Two modifications  are  particularly  important.  The 
first  involves corporate  pensions. The national  accounts  treat  corporate 
pension contributions  as a corporate labor cost and a component of 
personal  labor  income, while imputing  interest  and  dividends  earned  on 
corporate  pension assets to individuals  and including  them as part of 
disposable  income. Actual payments  from  pension funds to pensioners 
are not included  in disposable  income, but are treated  as asset transac- 
tions within  the household  sector. Just as a household's  decision to sell 
common stock and receive cash in return  for an asset does not affect 
disposable  income,  neither  does the partial  withdrawal  of pension  assets. 
These conventions  imply  that  if firms  increase  their  pension  plan  contri- 
butions, corporate saving will fall and personal saving will rise. An 
increase  in the nominal  rate  of return  on pension  assets will also increase 
measured  personal  saving. 
The difficulty with this approach is that roughly three-fourths  of 
corporate  pension plans are defined-benefit  plans in which the firm  is 
liable  to provide  a particular  stream  of benefits  to workers  regardless  of 
the corporate pension plan's asset position.4 Variations in pension 
funding  affect neither  the firm's  total pension liability  nor the value of 
the employees' pension asset. The assets in defined-benefit  plans are 
effectively assets of the corporation,  and contributions  to these plans 
net of changes  in liabilities  should  be considered  corporate  rather  than 
personal saving. The asset  income of  defined-benefit  plans should 
similarly  be credited  to the corporate  sector. These adjustments  do not 
affect total private saving, but they alter the shares of corporate  and 
personal  saving. 
3. Undistributed  profits net of the inventory  valuation  adjustment  and the capital 
consumption  adjustment  for the domestic  financial  and  nonfinancial  corporate  sectors  are 
drawn  from  NIPA, table 1.16. Undistributed  profits  of foreign  affiliates  are reported  in 
NIPA, table  6.23. 
4. A more  complete  discussion  of saving  issues posed by corporate  pension  contribu- 
tions may  be found  in B. Douglas  Bernheim  and  John  B. Shoven, "Pension  Funding  and 
Saving,"  in Zvi Bodie, John  B. Shoven, and David A. Wise, eds., Pensions in the U.S. 
Economy  (University  of Chicago  Press, forthcoming). 460  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Illustrative  calculations  presented  below allocate  all income  from  and 
contributions to  defined-benefit  plans, net of  benefit payments, to 
corporate saving. That approach  probably overstates the amount of 
corporate  saving through  pension plans, since increases in plan assets 
are partly  offset by accruing  liabilities.  The adjustment  reported  below 
is strictly accurate only if the stock of net pension liabilities  remains 
constant. Since it is virtually impossible to measure the level or the 
changes in the net liabilities  of defined-benefit  plans, the adjustment  is 
based only on observable  cash flows.5 
The second modification  involves the national  accounts' failure to 
adjust  corporate  saving  for  inflationary  gains  on corporate  debt, although 
the accounts adjust  profits  for spurious  inflation  gains on inventory  and 
for the difference between capital consumption  on a historical and a 
replacement-cost  basis. The accounting  failure  arises  from  the focus on 
nominal  rather  than  real  interest  payments.  During  inflationary  periods, 
nominal  interest  payments  are  partly  a repayment  of principal,  a transfer 
that offsets the inflationary  erosion of the lenders' real asset value. By 
subtracting nominal interest payments from corporate income, the 
national  accounts treat this repayment  of principal  as an expense and 
therefore  mismeasure  corporate  saving. 
The magnitude of this mismeasurement  depends on the balance 
between nonfinancial  corporations,  which are net borrowers,  and  finan- 
cial corporations,  which  are net lenders.  In the 1950s,  the nominal  assets 
of financial  corporations  virtually offset the nominal liabilities of the 
nonfinancial  corporations,  so the required  correction  to corporate  saving 
was trivial.  By the late 1970s,  however, the net nominal  liabilities  of the 
nonfinancial  firms  were substantially  greater  than the nominal  assets of 
the financial  corporations,  and  correcting  the inflation-induced  transfers 
therefore  raised  corporate  saving. 
Table  2 reports  the pension  and  interest  rate  adjustments  to corporate 
saving. The first column presents NIPA net corporate saving as a 
percentage of  NNP.  The second column shows the correction for 
5. Accurate  measurement  of net liabilities  requires  detailed  information  on the market 
value  of pension  assets and  the  characteristics  of both  pension  plans  and  their  participants. 
It also requires  forecasts  about  future  mortality  rates  and  discount  factors. Even without 
these difficulties  of implementation,  there are controversial  conceptual issues in the 
definition  of pension  liabilities.  These issues are discussed  at length  in Jeremy  I. Bulow, 
"What Are Corporate  Pension Liabilities," Quarterly  Journtlal  of Economics, vol. 97 
(August  1982),  pp. 435-52. James  M. Poterba  461 
corporate  saving through  defined-benefit  pension plans. Since pension 
contributions  plus pension income exceed benefit  outflows  for most of 
the postwar period, pension-adjusted  corporate saving exceeds unad- 
justed saving. For the 1980s, the pension adjustment  raises corporate 
saving  by 1.5  percentage  points  from  2.1 percent  to 3.6 percent  of NNP. 
Although  the pension adjustment  is somewhat larger  during  the 1980s 
than  in  either  of the  previous  decades,  pension-adjusted  corporate  saving 
still exhibits  a marked  decline since the 1960s. 
The third  column  of table  2 shows the saving  adjustment  for inflation- 
ary gains on corporate debt, net of losses on nominal assets held in 
defined-benefit  pension  plans. This inflation  correction  raises corporate 
saving  an average  of approximately  0.5 percent of NNP during  the last 
two decades, with  the largest  effect during  the mid-1970s.  In 1980,  when 
NIPA corporate  saving was 1.6 percent of NNP, inflationary  gains on 
nominal  liabilities  increased corporate  saving by 0.6 percent of NNP. 
The inflation  adjustment  has become less important  in recent years as 
the inflation  rate has fallen. In 1986, gains on nominal  liabilities  raised 
corporate saving only 0.2 percent of NNP.  The inflation correction 
therefore  accentuates  the decline in corporate  saving  during  the 1980s. 
The pension  and  inflation  corrections  increase  the corporate  share  of 
total private saving. Although NIPA measures attribute  just over 40 
percent  of net private  saving  in the past three years to corporations,  the 
two adjustments  raise that share to nearly two-thirds. Adjusted net 
corporate  saving exceeds net personal saving throughout  the postwar 
period. 
Further  adjustments  to the reported  corporate  saving series are also 
possible. The national  income accounts ignore accruing  capital gains 
and losses as well as the proceeds of asset sales in the definition  of 
income, and do not treat outlays for asset acquisition  as an expense. 
This  exclusion  poses aparticular  problem  in  measuring  corporate  saving, 
since cash dividends  and share  repurchases  are treated  differently.  If a 
corporation  uses after-tax  profits  to pay cash  dividends,  corporate  saving 
falls and disposable  income (hence personal  saving)  rises. If the corpo- 
ration  uses its funds to repurchase  shares, however, the expenditure  is 
treated  as an asset transaction  that  neither  reduces corporate  saving  nor 
increases personal disposable income. Such expenditures  are not de- 
ducted from after-tax  earnings  in computing  undistributed  profits, in- 
ducing  a potential  inconsistency  in  the  measurement  of corporate  saving. 
It is impossible  to avoid  some inconsistency  in distinguishing  personal 462  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 2.  Adjusted Corporate Saving Measures, United States,  1950-86 
Percent of NNP 
NIPA  net 
corporaie  Pension  Iniflation  Repurchase 
Year  saving  adjustmenta  adjustrnentb  adjustinente 
1950  3.1  0.5  -0.1  -0.1 
1951  2.9  0.5  0.0  -  0.1 
1952  3.0  0.6  0.0  0.0 
1953  2.5  0.6  0.0  0.0 
1954  2.9  0.6  0.0  -  0.1 
1955  4.0  0.7  0.0  -0.1 
1956  3.3  0.7  0.0  -0.1 
1957  3.0  0.7  0.0  -  0.1 
1958  2.4  0.7  0.0  0.0 
1959  3.5  0.8  0.0  -  0.1 
1960  3.0  0.8  0.0  0.0 
1961  2.9  0.8  0.0  -0.2 
1962  3.8  0.8  0.0  -  0.3 
1963  3.9  0.8  0.0  -  0.1 
1964  4.2  0.8  0.0  -  0.2 
1965  4.8  0.9  0.1  -0.2 
1966  4.7  0.9  0.1  -0.1 
1967  4.2  0.9  0.1  -  0.2 
1968  3.6  0.9  0.4  -  0.1 
1969  2.9  0.9  0.4  -  0.1 
from corporate saving. Distinguishing  stock repurchases from other 
types of asset purchases,  including  purchase  of stock  in  other  companies, 
would link the corporate  saving rate to the type of assets purchased  by 
corporations.  Treating  share  repurchases  and  dividends  alike  would  lead 
to inconsistencies  between asset transactions  that  transferred  cash from 
firms  to households. If a household were to sell a patent or equity in a 
partnership  to a corporation,  the sale  would  not  alter  measured  corporate 
saving, while selling  corporate  stock back to the firm  would. Moreover, 
if share  repurchases  were considered  net dissaving, then debt-financed 
common  stock repurchases  would affect measured  saving, even though 
these  transactions  simply  exchange  one security  for  another.  In  principle, 
corporate saving could be measured net of all asset transactions. It 
would then correspond  to gross capital  formation  within  the corporate 
sector. But that  is not the concept that  the national  income  accountants, 
concerned  with the share  of corporate  income that is reinvested  within 
the corporate  sector, attempt  to measure. James  M. Poterba  463 
Table 2.  (continued) 
Percent of NNP 
NIPA  net 
corporate  Pension  Inflationt  Repurchase 
Year  saving  adjustmenta  adjustmentb  adjuistrnente 
1970  1.9  0.9  0.5  -  0.1 
1971  2.6  1.0  0.7  -0.1 
1972  3.1  1.0  0.5  -0.2 
1973  3.0  1.1  0.8  -0.1 
1974  1.5  1.2  1.0  -0.1 
1975  2.6  1.4  0.9  -0.1 
1976  2.9  1.4  0.5  -  0.1 
1977  3.5  1.5  0.5  -  0.2 
1978  3.4  1.6  0.6  0.2 
1979  2.8  1.7  0.6  -0.2 
1980  1.6  1.9  0.6  -0.2 
1981  1.6  1.8  0.4  -0.5 
1982  0.7  1.7  0.3  -0.4 
1983  2.2  1.6  0.2  -0.7 
1984  2.7  1.4  0.1  -  1.0 
1985  3.0  1.2  0.2  --0.7 
1986  2.9  1.0  0.2  -0.7 
Averages 
1950-59  3.0  0.6  0.0  -0.1 
1960-69  3.8  0.9  0.1  -0.2 
1970-79  2.7  1.2  0.6  -  0.1 
1980-86  2.1  1.5  0.3  -  0.6 
Sources:  Net  corporate saving from table  I  col.  4. Adjustments  are computed  by author.  See text description. 
a.  The correction  for defined-benefit pension  plans adds 0.72 times (employer  contributions  to pension  and profit 
sharing plans less  benefits paid from these  plans plus imputed interest  received  by households  from pension  plans) 
to the flow of corporate saving. Time series on cont:ribution, benefit, and initerest flows are found in National  Income 
and Product Accounts,  tables 6.11 and 8.8.  The 0.72 factor is the fraction of pension  assets  in defined-benefit plans 
in 1978, as reported in Emily S. Andrews,  The Changing Profile of Pensionis inz  America (Washington, D.C.: Employee 
Benefit Research  Institute,  1985). This fraction  has  remained  relativelv  stable  since  1971, when  data first became 
available,  so  the error associated  with  assuming  a constant  value  through time  does  not  seem  large. The  share of 
the imputed interest flow from life insurance and pension funds is allocated to pensions  using Federal Reserve  Board 
data on the share of total life insurance assets  that are held for pension  plans. 
b.  The inflation adjustment is computed as the annual (fourth-quarter-to-fourth-quarter) change in the GNP deflator 
times the book  value of net corporate  debt.  The data series  for the book  valtue of outstanding  corporate  debt was 
provided by Joosung Jun. The book value of nominal assets  in defined-benefit pension  plans was estimated using the 
Federal Reserve  Board's Flow of Funds Account  data on pension  assets  held by both life insurance companies  and 
private pension funds. Since the Flow of Funds does  not distinguish defined-benefit from defined-contribution plans, 
the earlier allocation of 72 percent of assets  to defined benefit plans was applied. 
c.  Corporate share repurchases. 
This paper  focuses on corporate  saving unadjusted  for share repur- 
chases. To highlight  the difference  between  this approach  and  one using 
the  repurchase-adjusted  saving  series, the last column  of table  2 presents 
the ratio  of share  repurchases  to net national  product.  Throughout  most 
of the  postwar  period,  stock  repurchases  constituted  a negligible  fraction 464  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
of corporate earnings. The 1980s, however, have witnessed a rapid 
increase  in repurchases.6  If corporate  saving  in 1985  had  been measured 
net of share  repurchases,  it would have been 0.7 percent  of NNP below 
its unadjusted  level. 
WHY  HAS  CORPORATE  SAVING  DECLINED? 
Tables 1  and  2 show that  net corporate  saving  as a share  of net national 
product  has declined during  the last two decades. Some insight on the 
source of this decline is provided by the accounting identity linking 
corporate saving to pretax profits, interest payments, dividends, and 
corporate  taxes: 
(1)  CORPSAVE  = INCOME  -  REALINT 
-  DIVIDENDS  -  TAXES. 
INCOME  corresponds  to corporate  earnings  before interest  and taxes, 
after  accounting  for inventory  valuation  gains and capital  consumption. 
REALINT  corresponds  to net real interest  payments, net interest  from 
NIPA plus the inflationary  gain  on corporate  debt. DIVIDENDS  denote 
net payments  on both common  and  preferred  stock, and TAXES  include 
federal  as well as state and  local corporate  profits  taxes. 
The decline in corporate  saving is largely due to lower profits and 
higher  interest  burdens;  lower corporate  taxes have partially  offset the 
decline. Pretax corporate  profits have declined from 11.6 percent of 
NNP during  the 1960s  to 10.1  percent  during  the 1970s  and  to 9.3 percent 
during  the 1980s.  Falling  profitability  is therefore  a key to the decline in 
net corporate  saving. If all other  factors had been constant, the decline 
in profits  would have lowered corporate  saving by 0.8 percent of NNP 
between the 1970s  and the 1980s. Higher real interest payments have 
further  reduced corporate  saving. From a negligible  level in the 1960s 
and  0.5 percent  of NNP during  the 1970s,  real interest  payments  rose to 
1.8  percent  of NNP in the 1980s.  The  ratio  of interest  to corporate  income 
6. The growth  in repurchases  is probably  related  both to takeover  pressures  and to 
managers'  gradual  discovery  that  the IRS  would  not  treat  large  repurchases  as if they were 
dividend  payments. Carol J. Loomis, "Beating the Market  by Buying Back Stock," 
Fortune (April 29, 1985), pp. 42-52, is a useful introduction  to corporate  repurchase 
activity.  A detailed  discussion  of the implications  of repurchases  for studies  of corporate 
behavior  is John B. Shoven, "The Tax Consequences  of Share  Repurchases  and Other 
Non-Dividend  Cash Payments  to Equity  Owners," in Lawrence  H. Summers,  ed., Tax 
Policy and the Economy (MIT Press,  1987), pp. 29-54. James  M. Poter-ba  465 
increased  even more  dramatically.  In  part  offsetting  the  first  two factors, 
corporate  taxes have declined from 4.4 percent of NNP in the 1960s  to 
3.5 percent in the  1970s and 2.3 percent in the  1980s. Accelerated 
depreciation  and  the  drop  in  corporate  taxes due  to falling  profits  reduced 
tax burdens  nearly  enough  to offset the profitability  decline. The ratio  of 
corporate  taxes to corporate  income  has dropped  from  47 percent  in the 
1950s  to 35 percent  in the 1970s  and 25 percent  in the 1980s. 
The corporate saving identity also indicates some of the channels 
through  which the Tax Reform Act of 1986 may influence corporate 
saving. Changes  in average corporate  tax payments will alter the cash 
flow  available  for shareholders,  potentially  affecting  both  dividends  and 
corporate  saving. Changes  in marginal  tax rates on firms  and investors 
will also affect the share  of corporate  profits  going  to interest  payments, 
retentions,  and dividends  and will thus affect the level of undistributed 
profits.  Changes  in marginal  tax incentives  for investment,  as well as in 
the relative advantages of internal  versus external finance, may also 
affect the level of corporate saving. The sources and uses of funds 
identity  for the corporate  sector requires  that 
(2)  INV  =  CORPSAVE  +  AEQUITY +  LDEBT, 
where INV designates investment outlays, AEQUITY  corresponds  to 
net new equity issues, and ADEBT  measures the change in net debt 
outstanding.  Although  this study focuses on how changes in average 
corporate  tax rates and dividend payout incentives affect corporate 
saving, further  study of the tax reform's impact on investment  would 
provide  additional  information  on its ultimate  consequences for private 
saving. 
Taxation  and Corporate Dividend Payout 
The impact  on corporate  saving  of changing  the relative  tax burdens 
on dividends  and capital  gains is one of the most controversial  issues of 
capital  income taxation.7  A preliminary  analysis of corporate  financial 
7. This section draws heavily on James Poterba and Lawrence Summers, "The 
Economic  Effects  of Dividend  Taxation,"  in Edward  I. Altman  and  Marti  G. Subrahman- 
yam, Recent Advances  in Corporate Finance  (Homewood,  Illinois: R. D. Irwin,  1985), 
pp. 227-84. A related  discussion  may be found  in Alan Auerbach,  "Taxation,  Corporate 
Financial  Policy and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Economic Literature,  vol. 21 
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policy suggests  that  because some shareholders  are tax-penalized  when 
firms pay dividends instead of using cash to repurchase  shares, firms 
should not pay dividends  at all, but should use nondividend  channels 
such  as share  repurchases  to transfer  cash  to shareholders.  Nevertheless, 
dividend  payments  are an enduring  practice  of most large  corporations, 
and many investors incur  substantial  tax liabilities  as a result. In 1986, 
individuals  paid  an estimated  $27  billion  dollars  in taxes on $81.2  billion 
of dividends.8 
There are three major  views of how dividend  and corporate  income 
taxation affect corporate  saving. The first two imply that changes in 
household  dividend  tax rates will not affect corporate  saving. The third 
and  more  traditional  view, which  holds  that  dividends  are  set by balancing 
the dividend  tax  burden  against  the benefits  of paying  dividends,  suggests 
that changes in the relative tax burden  on dividends and capital gains 
will affect corporate  saving. The empirical  evidence supports  the tradi- 
tional  view. 
THE  TAX-IRRELEVANCE  VIEW 
The tax-irrelevance  view assumes that share prices for dividend- 
paying  firms  are  set by investors  who  face equal  tax burdens  on dividends 
and  capital  gains.9  Since marginal  investors  do not demand  higher  pretax 
returns to induce them to hold dividend-paying  securities, dividend- 
paying firms are not penalized in the marketplace.  Tax changes that 
affect neither the identity nor the tax treatment of these marginal 
investors  will not affect firms'  incentives  to pay dividends. 
In several  situations,  marginal  investors  could  be untaxed  on dividend 
income. Untaxed  institutional  investors  such  as universities  and  pension 
funds, for example, held 32 percent  of U.S. corporate  equity at the end 
of 1986.  10  The dividend  tax burden  is also effectively zero for individuals 
8. This estimate  is calculated  using the TAXSIM  data file at the National  Bureau  of 
Economic  Research. 
9. For a fuller  exposition  of this view, see Merton  H. Miller  and Myron  S. Scholes, 
"Dividends  and Taxes," Journal  of Financial  Economics, vol. 6 (December  1978),  pp. 
333-64. 
10. This  calculation  is based  on the Federal  Reserve's  Flow  of Funds  data,  aggregating 
the equity holdings  of private  pension funds plus 20 percent of the equity held in the 
household  sector, which  includes  persons,  nonprofit  institutions,  and  trusts.  The share  of James  M. Poterba  467 
for whom dividend  income relaxes restrictions  on interest deductions 
that  are  related  to investment  income. In  both  of these cases, the untaxed 
status of the marginal  investor leads immediately  to the classic Miller- 
Modigliani  irrelevance  result for a taxless world. Changes  in tax rates 
on individuals  who are not marginal  investors will leave incentives for 
corporate  payout, and  hence corporate  saving,  unchanged. 
The assumption that marginal  investors are untaxed is ultimately 
verifiable  only  from  empirical  study.  The somewhat  controversial  finding 
that  on ex-dividend  days share  prices decline  less than  the value of their 
dividends  suggests that marginal  investors may face higher  tax rates on 
dividends  than  on capital  gains.  11 This assumption  can also be tested by 
studying the reaction of  corporate payout decisions to  changes in 
dividend  tax burdens. 
The  principal  weakness of the irrelevance  view is its failure  to explain 
why substantial  numbers  of investors  who are taxed on dividend  income 
hold  dividend-paying  securities.  Based only on tax considerations,  these 
individuals  should prefer firms that distribute  profits by repurchasing 
shares,  and  it is not clear  why a clientele  of such firms  has not arisen  and 
eliminated  dividend  tax revenues. 
THE  TAX-CAPITALIZATION  VIEW 
Both the second and third  views of dividend  taxation  postulate that 
shares  are valued as if the marginal  investor faces a higher  tax rate on 
household equity held by nonprofits  is based oIn Robert B. Avery and Gregory E. 
Elliehausen,  "Financial  Characteristics  of High Income Families," Federal Reserve 
Bulletin,  vol. 72 (March  1986),  p. 175. 
11. The ex-dividend  evidence suggesting  that investors are taxed more heavily on 
dividends  than  on capital  gains  includes  Edwin  J. Elton  and  Martin  J. Gruber,  "Marginal 
Stockholder Tax Rates and the Clientele  Effect,"  Review  of Economics  and Statistics, 
vol. 52 (February  1970),  pp. 68-74; Robert  H. Litzenberger  and Krishna  Ramaswamy, 
"The Effect of Personal  Taxes and Dividends on Capital Asset Prices: Theory and 
Empirical Evidence,"  Journal of Financial  Economics,  vol.  7 (June 1979), pp.  163-95; 
and Michael  Barclay,  "Tax Effects with No Taxes? The Ex-Dividend  Day Behavior  of 
Common  Stock  Prices  Prior to  the  Income  Tax,"  Journall of  Financial  Economics, 
forthcoming.  Merton  H. Miller and Myron S. Scholes, "Dividends and Taxes: Some 
Empirical  Evidence,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 90 (December  1982),  pp. 1118- 
41; and Roger H. Gordon  and David E. Bradford,  "Taxation  and the Stock Market 
Valuation  of Capital  Gains  and Dividends:  Theory and Empirical  Results," Journal  of 
Public  Economics,  vol. 14  (October  1980),  pp. 109-36,  question  this evidence  and  suggest 
that  taxes  do not affect  valuation. 468  Brookings Papers  on Econiomic Activity,  2:1987 
dividends  than on capital  gains. These two views, which try to explain 
why corporations  pay dividends  in spite of their  tax disadvantage,  differ 
in  their  predictions  about  how  changes  in  dividend  tax  rates  and  corporate 
tax burdens affect corporate saving. The two views make different 
assumptions  about  the constraints  on corporate  financial  behavior, and 
each could apply  to some corporations.  Empirical  evidence is needed to 
determine which view more accurately captures the overall effect of 
taxes on corporate  saving. 
The tax-capitalization  view applies to mature firms with after-tax 
profits in excess of their desired investment expenditures.12  Figure 1 
depicts  both  the firm's  investment  opportunity  locus and  its cost of funds 
schedule with a kink  at the point where the supply  of internal  finance  is 
exhausted.I3  Firms  whose behavior  is accurately  described  by the tax- 
capitalization  view will have excess cash flow after  financing  all invest- 
ment. If they cannot find tax-free channels for transferring  income to 
shareholders,  then retained  earnings  are  their  marginal  source  of invest- 
ment  funds. Dividend  payments  are determined  as the residual  after  the 
firms  finance  all profitable  projects  from  internal  cash flow. 
Provided  the firm  anticipates  using  retained  earnings  as the marginal 
source of funds in all future  periods, dividend  taxes have no effect on 
investment  decisions, as can be illustrated  with a two-period  example. 
In the first  period, investors forgo (1 -  in) dollars of after-tax  income 
when the firm invests one dollar, where m is the household marginal 
dividend  tax rate.  In the second  period,  the firm  receives 1 + (1 -  v)f'(k) 
o01 its investment, where v  denotes the corporate tax rate, and the 
firm distributes the earnings as dividends. The shareholder  receives 
(I  -  m)  [1  +  (1  -  T)f(k)], or a rate of return  of (1 -  T)f'(k).  Because 
12. The tax-capitalization  view was developed  by Alan J. Auerbach,  "Wealth  Max- 
imization  and  the Cost  of Capital,  " Quarter  ly Journal ofEconomics,  vol. 93 (August  1979), 
pp. 433-46; David F. Bradford,  "The Incidence and Allocation Effects of a Tax on 
Corporate  Distributions,"  Journal  of Public  Econiomics,  vol. 15 (February  1981), pp. 
1-22; and Mervyn  A. King, Public Policy  and the Corporation (London:  Chapman  and 
Hall, 1977). 
13. Differences  between  the cost of internal  and  external  finance  can be generated  in 
models  with either  imperfect  information  or taxes. An example  of the former  is provided 
in Stewart  C. Myers, "The Capital  Structure  Puzzle," Journal of Finance,  vol. 39 (July 
1984),  pp. 575-92. The tax considerations  that lead to differences  in the cost of internal 
and  external  funds  are  described  in Alan  J. Auerbach,  "Taxes, Firm  Financial  Policy, and 
the Cost of Capital:  An Empirical  Analysis," Journal  of  Public  Economics,  vol. 23 
(February-March  1984),  pp. 27-57. James  M. Poterba  469 
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the shareholder  is liable  for dividend  taxes whenever  the money is paid 
out, the level of the dividend  tax rate has no effect on the rate of return 
he requires  the firm  to earn. 
The firm  therefore  sets (1 -  i)f'(k) equal to the investor's discount 
rate, regardless  of m. Since dividends  are determined  as the difference 
between after-tax  profits  and new investment,  the level of the dividend 
tax rate, which affects neither profits nor investment, will not affect 
corporate  saving.  14 In contrast,  changes  in the corporate  tax rate have a 
substantial  effect on corporate  saving. Unless increased  tax payments 
14. Investment  is not affected by the level of the dividend  tax rate. Tax changes, 
however,  do temporarily  affect intertemporal  rates of substitution  and therefore  invest- 
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cause the supply of retained earnings  to fall below the firm's desired 
investment  level, the firm  will maintain  investment  and  reduce  dividends 
dollar-for-dollar  with increased  taxes."5 
The  primary  weakness  of the tax-capitalization  view is that  it assumes 
that firms have no alternatives to dividends for distributing  cash to 
shareholders.  Although  that assumption  might  have been true until  the 
early 1980s, when relatively few firms  were repurchasing  shares, it is 
untenable  today. Table  3 displays  the pattern  of corporate  cash payouts 
during  the last decade for the firms  in the Industrial  COMPUSTAT  data 
files. In 1985,  these firms  paid  $85.8  billion  in  cash  dividends,  repurchased 
$43.0 billion in common stock, and spent $74.5 billion  on cash acquisi- 
tions of other firms. Dividends accounted for less than 45 percent of 
corporate  cash  payout.  In  addition,  many  firms  were  operating  on several 
financial  margins  simultaneously.  In 1985,  for example, 31.7 percent  of 
the firms  that  paid  dividends  also repurchased  some common  stock. The 
explosion in alternatives  to cash dividends  raises serious doubts about 
the basic assumption  underlying  the tax-capitalization  view and under- 
scores that rather  than explaining  why firms pay dividends, this view 
assumes that they must pay dividends  and then analyzes the incidence 
effects of tax changes. 
A further  weakness is the assumption  that dividend  payments are a 
residual  in the corporate  accounts and are therefore  subject  to substan- 
tial variation.  Developments that increase desired investment should, 
in theory, reduce dividend  payments, making  dividends as volatile as 
investment expenditures. But for nonfinancial corporations during 
1947-86,  the standard  deviation  of the annual  change  in real investment 
expenditures  was $15.8  billion  (1982  dollars),  compared  with  $2.2 billion 
for real dividends. 
THE  TRADITIONAL  VIEW 
The third  and more  traditional  view of dividend  taxation  resolves the 
dividend puzzle by arguing simply that shareholders  value dividend 
15. Changes  in corporate  tax rates  also affect  the cost of capital,  (1 -  T) -'p,  for p, the 
shareholder's  required  after-tax  rate  of return.  A shift  in  T will therefore  reduce  dividends 
through  the cash flow or average tax rate effect, but this will be partly offset by the 
reduction  in investment  due to the increased  cost of capital.  Provided  investment  is not 
too sensitive  to changes  in the cost of capital,  the average  tax rate  effect will  predominate. James  M. Poterba  471 
Table 3.  Corporate Cash Distributions,  1976-85 
Billions  of dollars 
Cash  Share 
Year  dividends  repurchases  Acquisitions 
1976  36.4  1.8  4.3 
1977  42.1  3.9  7.1 
1978  47.0  4.3  10.0 
1979  54.8  5.6  20.7 
1980  60.9  6.6  17.9 
1981  71.2  6.2  34.6 
1982  76.0  10.6  29.7 
1983  82.3  9.8  24.2 
1984  86.4  30.3  62.6 
1985  85.8  43.0  74.5 
Source:  Author's  calculations  based  on the universe  of companies  on the combined  COMPUSTAT  Industrial  and 
Research  data  files. 
payments.  Firms  that  pay dividends  thereby  derive  an advantage  that  is 
reflected in their market value. Although the reason dividends are 
valuable remains unclear, some possible explanations include their 
signaling  role in demonstrating  managerial  confidence  in the company's 
prospects, the need to  restrict managerial  discretion, and possible 
consumption  planning  benefits  conferred  on dividend  recipients.  16 While 
recognizing  that firms can repurchase  shares, advocates of this view 
argue  that firms  nonetheless pay dividends  because at the margin,  the 
benefits  from payout  just equal the additional  tax burdens associated 
with dividends  rather  than share  repurchases. 
This intrinsic  dividend value can be modeled by assuming  that the 
discount  rate  investors  apply  to the firm's  income stream  (p)  depends  on 
the payout ratio (cx),  so p =  p(cx),  p' <  0. While dividend taxes make 
dividend payments unattractive,  the lower discount rate that results 
16. One example  of a signaling  model of dividend  behavior  is Merton  H. Miller  and 
Kevin  Rock, "Dividend  Policy  under  Asymmetric  Information,"  Journal  of Finance, vol. 
40 (September  1985), pp. 1031-51. Agency-cost models are summarized  in Frank H. 
Easterbrook,  "Two Agency-Cost Explanations  of Dividends," American Economnic 
Review,  vol. 74 (June  1984),  pp. 650-59. Two other  ingenious  explanations  of why firms 
pay  dividends,  focusing  on the value  these payouts  provide  to shareholders,  are  provided 
by Hersh M. Shefrin and Meir Statman, "Explaining  Investor Preference  for Cash 
Dividends,"  Journal  of Financial  Economics,  vol. 13  (June  1984),  pp. 253-82;  and  Andrei 
Shleifer  and  Robert  W. Vishny, "Large  Shareholders  and  Corporate  Control,"  Journal  of 
Political  Economy,  vol. 94 (June  1986),  pp. 461-88. 472  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
from higher  payout induces firms  to pay dividends. The firm's cost of 
capital,  the pretax  return  it must  earn  to provide  investors  with an after- 
tax return  of p, is 
(3)  C  =  ~~~~~P(O*) 
(3)  c  =  (1 -  v) [(1  -  -  m)O*  +  (1  -  z)(1  -( 
where z is the effective tax rate on capital gains. The cost of capital 
depends on cx*,  the payout rate that maximizes market  value. It also 
involves a weighted  average  of the after-tax  income  associated  with one 
dollar  of dividends  and one dollar  of retained  earnings  or share repur- 
chases, with weights depending  on the dividend  payout ratio. On this 
view, both investment  and payout choices are affected  by dividend  tax 
changes. Dividend  tax reductions  lower  the marginal  cost of signaling  or 
other benefits, therefore  raising  the optimal steady-state  payout ratio, 
and lower the cost of capital for new investment projects, raising  the 
steady-state  capital  stock and  therefore  investment.  17 
The major  weakness of the traditional  view is that it assumes that 
investors demand  dividends,  but it does not provide  a reason why they 
should. Current  models of dividend  behavior  provide only weak moti- 
vation for the p(cx)  function, and there are few good explanations  why 
firms  should  choose cash dividends  rather  than  less heavily  taxed means 
of communicating  information  to their  shareholders.  18 
The traditional  view also has difficulty  explaining  the infrequency  of 
new share  issues. Firms  rely primarily  on free cash flow and borrowing 
to finance investment. In 1985, for example, only 16.2 percent of the 
corporations  in the Industrial  COMPUSTAT  file issued new equity 
worth more than 5 percent of their existing capital stock. Only 32.6 
percent of firms reported any increase in common stock. Forty-nine 
percent  of companies  did  not  engage  in  any  external  financial  transactions 
involving equity or long-term  debt. It is possible, however, that new 
equity is still the marginal  source  of funds  for some of these firms.  They 
may use short-term  borrowing  to finance  projects  in years when they do 
not issue equity, and  then redeem  the debt when they issue new shares. 
17. A reduction  in the dividend  tax encourages  payout  by lowering  the marginal  cost 
of obtaining  the benefits  of dividend  payments,  but it also encourages  investment.  In the 
short  run,  the effect of a dividend  tax cut on corporate  payout  is therefore  ambiguous. 
18. One agency-theoretic  account  of why managers  may avoid share  repurchases  is 
provided by Michael Barclay and Clifford Smith, "Corporate  Payout Policy: Cash 
Dividends vs. Share Repurchases"  (William  Simon Graduate  School of Management, 
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Moreover,  a wide variety  of common  financial  activities-such  as cash- 
financed takeovers-are  in fact equivalent to equity issue or share 
repurchase. 
ESTIMATING  CORPORATE  PAYOUT  FUNCTIONS 
One  way to evaluate  the competing  views of how dividend  taxes affect 
corporate  saving  is to test whether  payout  policy responds  to changes  in 
the relative  tax burden  on dividends  and capital  gains. Several studies 
have shown  that  Great  Britain's  repeated  changes  in the relative  burden 
of corporate  and personal  taxes affected corporate  payout.19  With the 
exception of  John Brittain's study on  U.S.  taxation and dividend 
behavior  before 1960  and a small literature  debating  the effects of the 
1936  Undistributed  Profits  Tax, however, there has been little evidence 
on how dividend  taxes affect payout policy in the United States.20  The 
variation  in tax rates due to the tax reforms  of 1964, 1969, and 1981, 
along with the changing pattern of share ownership, now makes it 
possible  to test the competing  theories. 
The controversy surrounding  why firms pay dividends makes it 
difficult  to motivate  an empirical  payout equation.  No widely accepted 
theoretical model of payout behavior can be invoked to derive an 
estimating  equation. Most empirical  studies of dividend  behavior  thus 
adopt  an  ad hoc specification  first  proposed  by John  Lintner  on the basis 
of interviews  with corporate  financial  officers.21 Lintner postulated a 
19. The  studies  showing  that  British  dividends  responded  to tax  changes  include  Martin 
S.  Feldstein, "Corporate  Taxation and Dividend Behaviour," Review of Economic 
Studies,  vol.  37 (June 1970), pp. 57-72;  King,  Public Policy  and the Corporation; and 
Poterba  and  Summers,  "Economic  Effects," pp. 264-70. 
20. John  A. Brittain,  Corporate  Dividend  Policy (Brookings,  1966).  The studies  of the 
undistributed  profits  tax are summarized  in George  E. Lent, The  Impact  of the Undistri- 
buted Profits Tax, 1936-37 (Columbia University Press,  1948). 
21. John Lintner,  "The Distribution  of Incomes of Corporations  among  Dividends, 
Retained Earnings, and Taxes,"  American Economic  Review,  vol. 46 (May 1956, Papers 
and  Proceedings,  1955),  pp. 97-113. This  partial-adjustment  framework  also provides  the 
basis  for the microeconometric  study  of dividend  payout  by Eugene  F. Fama  and  Harvey 
Babiak, "Dividend Policy: An Empirical Analysis,"  Journal of the American Statistical 
Association,  vol. 63 (December  1968),  pp. 1132-61.  A more recent study that provides 
some evidence against  the Lintner  model is Robert  McDonald  and Naomi Soderstrom, 
"Dividends  and Share  Changes:  Is There  a Financing  Hierarchy?"  Working  Paper  2029 
(National  Bureau  of Economic  Research, September  1986).  Alan J. Auerbach's  recent 
study, "Issues  in the Measurement  and  Encouragement  of Business Saving," in Federal 
Reserve Bank of Boston, Saving and Government  Policy (FRBB, 1982), pp. 79-100, 
estimates  aggregate  dividend  models  similar  to those reported  here  without  tax variables. 474  Brookings Paipers on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
partial-adjustment  model in which the change in dividends  depends on 
the divergence  between a dividend  target  and dividends  in the previous 
period.  He modeled  the dividend  target  as a function  of current  earnings, 
but it could also depend  on lagged  earnings  or dividend  taxes. 
The precise form of the dividend-adjustment  model is unclear. Pre- 
vious studies have not resolved whether managers  focus on real or 
nominal dividends, whether they frame adjustments in absolute or 
percentage  changes, or whether they consider dividends per share or 
total corporate  payout. The analysis below focuses on the logarithm  of 
aggregate  real dividends,  following several other time series studies of 
dividend payout.22  The estimating equation is based on the partial- 
adjustment  framework  and follows closely the recent application of 
"error-correction"  models to household consumption  behavior.23  The 
long-run  target  dividend  level (D*)  is assumed  to be a constant-elasticity 
function  of equity  earnings  (Y)  and  the after-tax  income associated  with 
one dollar  of corporate  dividend  payout  relative  to one dollar  of corporate 
retention  with resulting  capital  gains. If 0 denotes this ratio of after-tax 
incomes, the dividend  target  is: 
(4)  ln (D*) =  co-  +  ?  ,1  ln (Y)+  ?C2  ln (0). 
This steady-state  specification  is combined  with flexible short-run  dy- 
namics to obtain a model for the annual percentage change in real 
dividends: 
(5)  A  ln (D,) = Po +  1A ln (Y,) + r2A  ln (0) 
+  33In  (Dt_  1) -  ln (D*1)]  +  Et. 
Although  one could allow for richer dynamics by including  additional 
lagged values of the changes in both taxes and earnings, the limited 
amount  of information  in sixty years of annual  data made it impossible 
to reject  equation  5 as an adequate  dynamic  model. 
The dependent  variable  in equation  5 is the logarithmic  change  in real 
22. Feldstein,  "Corporate  Taxation,"  Brittain,  Corporate  Dividend  Policy, and  King, 
Public  Policy  and  the Corporation,  all focus  on the  logarithm of aggregate  dividends. 
Using the logarithm  of profits  as an independent  variable  requires  omission of several 
years  in the early 1930s  when  earnings  are  negative. 
23. These  models  are  discussed  in Alan  Blinder  and  Angus  Deaton, "The  Time  Series 
Consumption  Function  Revisited,"  BPEA,  2:1985,  pp. 465-51 I. James  M. Poterba  475 
dividend  payments  by domestic corporations.24  Several  different  meas- 
ures of earnings (Y,) are used to describe target dividends. The first 
equals after-tax  corporate  profits  as reported  in the NIPA. The second 
corrects  after-tax  profits  for the inventory  valuation  adjustment  and  the 
capital  consumption  adjustment.  The next two profit  measures  correct 
CCA-  and IVA-adjusted  profits  for the alternative  treatment  of pension 
contributions  and for the inflationary  gain on corporate debt, both 
described  in the last section. The final  earnings  measure  includes both 
of these adjustments. 
The tax preference  parameter  0, is a weighted average  across share- 
holders  of the after-tax  income  associated  with  dividend  payout, divided 
by the after-tax  income associated  with undistributed  profits: 
(6)  St  (1W-t  z)  T') 
In this sum  mit  is the marginal  dividend  tax rate  on investors  in class i, zit 
is the accrual-equivalent  capital gains tax rate, Tu is the rate of tax on 
undistributed  profits,  and  S is the number  of distinct  shareholder  classes 
in the analysis. Although this measure of Ot does not capture the tax 
treatment  of any particular  marginal  investor, it reflects broad move- 
ments in the relative  tax treatment  of dividends  and retentions. Equity 
ownership  weights  for  households,  pension  funds,  insurance  companies, 
and  banks  are obtained  from  the Federal  Reserve Board.25 
Within  the household  sector, the Internal  Revenue Service provides 
detailed  information  on the pattern  of dividend  income across income 
classes. Each class is treated as a separate shareholder  category in 
equation  6, and the marginal  tax rate on dividend  income is computed 
for investors in each class. The capital  gains tax rate is constructed  by 
24. The  dividend  and  earnings  series  are  drawn  from  table 1.  16  of the National  Income 
and Product  Accounts. These data are restricted  to the domestic corporate  sector and 
exclude  foreign  subsidiaries,  which are part  of aggregate  corporate  saving,  because they 
may  be affected  by tax considerations  other  than  those governing  domestic  firms. 
25. Equity  ownership  weights  for households,  pension  funds, insurance  companies, 
and banks  are obtained  from the flow of funds for the period since 1952. The analysis 
focuses solely on domestic  equity  holdings,  implicitly  assigning  the average  domestic  tax 
rate  on equity  income  to foreign  investors  as well. Limited  information  on share  ownership 
before  1952  is reported  in the U.S. Congress,  House Committee  on Interstate  and  Foreign 
Commerce, Institutional Investor Study Report of the Securities and Exchange  Commis- 
sion, 92 Congress,  vol. 1 (Government  Printing  Office, 1971),  p. 61. These ownership 
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assuming  that the effective accrual  rate is approximately  0.25 times the 
statutory  rate.26 
The final component  of the tax preference  parameter  is the tax rate 
on undistributed  profits. Throughout  the postwar period the United 
States has levied the same tax on all corporate  income and then taxed 
both dividends and capital gains again at the shareholder  level. There 
was an important  deviation  from this pattern  in 1936, however, when 
Congress enacted the Undistributed  Profits  Tax. This progressive tax 
with a maximum  rate  of 27 percent  was imposed  on undistributed  profits 
for 1936 and 1937. Although many firms distributed  a high enough 
fraction  of their  earnings  to avoid the tax, and  relatively  few firms  faced 
the  top  marginal  rates,  the  tax  nevertheless  imposed  a substantial  burden: 
the average marginal  tax rate on undistributed  profits was roughly 8 
percent. 
Table  4 reports  the time  series on the share  of corporate  equity  owned 
by households  as well as the relative  tax price  series  O. During  the 1930s, 
one dollar  of earnings  paid out as dividends  yielded shareholders  about 
15 cents less after-tax  income than one dollar  retained.  The increase in 
marginal  tax rates  during  and  after  World  War  II widened  the tax wedge 
between  dividends  and  undistributed  profits,  with  an average  tax penalty 
of 30-35 cents per dollar  between the 1940s and the early 1970s. The 
combination  of rising  institutional  share  ownership  and  marginal  tax rate 
reductions  in the early 1980s  lowered  the tax burden  on dividends.27  By 
1986, the weighted average tax disadvantage  on dividend  payout was 
only 21.7 cents per dollar,  the lowest since World  War  II. 
The last two columns  of table 4 report  annual  dividend  payout ratios 
for the corporate  sector. Column  three shows corporate  dividends  as a 
share of unadjusted  equity earnings, defined as profits after tax and 
nominal interest payments without either the IVA or the CCA. The 
fourth column shows payout as a fraction of equity earnings making 
these two corrections. The adjusted  payout rate averages 48 percent 
during  the past three years, compared  with 45 percent  during  the 1970s 
26. This  approach  to modeling  capital  gains  tax burdens  was used  in Martin  Feldstein, 
Louis Dicks-Mireaux,  and  James  Poterba,  "The Effective Tax Rate and the Pretax  Rate 
of Return," Journal of Public Economics,  vol. 21 (July 1983), pp. 129-58. 
27. The  calculation  of 0,  assumes  that  pension  funds  are  untaxed  institutions.  It ignores 
the possibility  that some defined-benefit  plans  may be terminated,  in which  case income 
from  the pension  assets would  be taxable  to the terminating  firm. James  M. Poterba  477 
and 40 percent during  the 1960s. Relative to unadjusted  earnings, the 
increase  in dividend  payout  is even more striking.  Dividends  in the past 
three years average  69.4 percent of unadjusted  equity profits, up from 
34 percent  and  42 percent  in the 1970s  and 1960s,  respectively. 
ECONOMETRIC  RESULTS 
The results  of estimating  equation  5 using  annual  data  for 1948-86  are 
reported  in table 5. In addition  to the explanatory  variables  described 
above, the estimating  equations include an indicator  variable for the 
effects of voluntary  dividend  guidelines  during  the wage and  price con- 
trol period of the early 1970s. This variable  equals unity for the years 
1972-74.28 
The results in table 5 demonstrate  the importance  of tax policy for 
corporate  payout. The tax preference  variable  enters virtually  all of the 
dividend  equations  in a statistically  significant  and substantively  impor- 
tant  way. The estimated  tax effects are similar  across various  specifica- 
tions: a 1 percent increase in the ratio of after-tax  dividend  income to 
after-tax  capital  gain  income raises real dividends  about  0.66 percent  in 
the short  run.  The long-run  effect of such a dividend  tax reduction  is a 2 
percent  to 3 percent payout increase. The dynamics  of adjustment  can 
be illustrated  using  the estimates  from  the third  column,  where  the equity 
profit  measure  is adjusted  for the CCA, IVA, and pensions. A dividend 
tax reduction  that causes a 1 percent  increase in 0 induces dividends  to 
rise by 0.63 percent, 0.92 percent, 1.13  percent, and 1.38  percent  in the 
four  subsequent  years. The steady-state  elasticity  of dividend  payments 
with respect to tax changes is 1.57 for this equation. These substantial 
tax effects suggest that neither  the tax-irrelevance  nor the tax-capitali- 
zation views of dividend  taxation are adequate  for modeling  the U.S. 
dividend  time series. 
Comparing  the various  equations  in table 5 provides some evidence 
on the relative  power of different  profit  measures  in explaining  payout 
decisions. The accounting  profit measure in the first column has the 
highest explanatory power, and the profit measures that recognize 
28. Voluntary  dividend  controls  were  in effect between  November  14, 1971,  and  April 
30, 1974.  The  guidelines  suggested  that  dividends  should  be limited  to 4 percent  above the 
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Table 4.  Tax Incentives for Payout and Dividend Payout Ratios,  1929-86 
Relative after- 
Share of  tax income  from  Dividend  payout  ratiob 
corporate  equity  dividends vs. 
owned by  retained  Accounting  Adjusted 
Year  individuals  earningsa  earnings  earnings 
1929  0.915  0.901  0.67  0.70 
1930  0.914  0.909  1.93  1.00 
1931  0.913  0.918  -4.44  3.64 
1932  0.911  0.851  -0.93  -  1.25 
1933  0.910  0.850  4.20  -  1.10 
1934  0.909  0.814  1.63  6.50 
1935  0.908  0.809  1.08  1.63 
1936  0.907  0.822  0.92  1.26 
1937  0.906  0.831  0.89  1.12 
1938  0.905  0.814  1.07  1.12 
1939  0.904  0.799  0.67  0.97 
1940  0.904  0.759  0.54  0.67 
1941  0.904  0.704  0.42  0.67 
1942  0.904  0.609  0.40  0.51 
1943  0.904  0.557  0.39  0.44 
1944  0.904  0.631  0.40  0.44 
1945  0.904  0.616  0.50  0.51 
1946  0.902  0.613  0.34  0.70 
1947  0.900  0.605  0.29  0.52 
1948  0.898  0.656  0.28  0.38 
1949  0.897  0.675  0.36  0.38 
1950  0.895  0.650  0.33  0.50 
1951  0.893  0.620  0.37  0.47 
1952  0.890  0.607  0.40  0.46 
1953  0.887  0.627  0.40  0.49 
1954  0.887  0.635  0.41  0.46 
1955  0.885  0.629  0.35  0.38 
1956  0.883  0.632  0.37  0.44 
1957  0.879  0.641  0.41  0.46 
1958  0.877  0.644  0.47  0.51 
1959  0.875  0.646  0.40  0.41 
1960  0.870  0.656  0.45  0.46 
1961  0.866  0.649  0.46  0.45 
1962  0.862  0.658  0.43  0.39 
1963  0.858  0.657  0.44  0.39 
1964  0.854  0.688  0.41  0.37 
1965  0.850  0.701  0.38  0.35 
1966  0.845  0.698  0.37  0.34 James  M. Poterba  479 
Table 4.  (continued) 
Relative  after- 
Share of  tax income from  Dividend payout  ratiob 
corporate  equity  dividends vs. 
owned by  retained  Accounting  Adjusted 
Year  individuals  earningsa  earnings  earnings 
1967  0.844  0.690  0.40  0.37 
1968  0.844  0.677  0.43  0.41 
1969  0.836  0.699  0.46  0.46 
1970  0.824  0.703  0.54  0.56 
1971  0.809  0.714  0.44  0.44 
1972  0.793  0.714  0.39  0.40 
1973  0.775  0.721  0.33  0.42 
1974  0.757  0.718  0.29  0.62 
1975  0.744  0.721  0.34  0.45 
1976  0.738  0.714  0.29  0.40 
1977  0.722  0.709  0.27  0.35 
1978  0.701  0.713  0.27  0.37 
1979  0.687  0.691  0.26  0.45 
1980  0.678  0.695  0.33  0.67 
1981  0.670  0.699  0.42  0.63 
1982  0.655  0.752  0.69  0.92 
1983  0.635  0.768  0.60  0.56 
1984  0.630  0.780  0.61  0.49 
1985  0.629  0.784  0.70  0.46 
1986  0.634  0.783  0.77  0.50 
Averages 
1930-39  0.909  0.842  0.70  1.49 
1940-49  0.902  0.643  0.39  0.52 
1950-59  0.885  0.633  0.39  0.46 
1960-69  0.853  0.677  0.42  0.40 
1970-79  0.753  0.711  0.34  0.45 
1980-86  0.647  0.752  0.59  0.61 
Source:  Author's calculations  with data from NIPA,  table  1.16. See  text description. 
a.  The tax preference parameter, Ot  (see  equation 6). 
b.  The  payout  share  of  accounting  earnings  is  defined  as  dividend  payments  by  domestic  corporate  business 
divided by after-tax profits plus nominal interest payments.  The payout  share of adjusted earnings adjusts the after- 
tax  profits plus nominal interest  series  in the  denominator  for the Inventory  Valuation  Adjustment  (IVA)  and the 
Capital Consumption Adjustment (CCA). 
inflationary  gains on corporate  debt have the worst fit, suggesting  that 
managers  may not consider these real gains in setting payout policy. 
Although  adjusting  accounting  earnings  for the CCA and IVA reduces 
the explanatory  power  of the dividend  model, adding  the defined-benefit 
pension  correction  as well yields an estimating  equation  that  fits almost 480  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 5.  Dividend Payout Models, 1948-86a 
Adjustments  to accolunting earnings 
CCA, 
CCA,  IVA, 
IVA, and  pensions, 
CCA,  inflation  and infla- 
Independent  Unadjusted  CCA and  IVA, and  gain on  tion gain 
variable  earnings  IVA  pensions  debt  on debt 
Constant  0.61  0.70  0.61  0.73  0.73 
(0.42)  (0.43)  (0.41)  (0.43)  (0.43) 
A ln (Y,)  0.18  0.11  0.15  0.11  0.12 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
A In (0)  0.78  0.64  0.63  0.65  0.61 
(0.35)  (0.39)  (0.37)  (0.39)  (0.39) 
ln (D,-1)  -0.13  -0.21  -0.32  -0.26  -0.30 
(0.08)  (0.  10)  (0.  1  1)  (0.  10)  (0.  1  1) 
ln (Y,_)  0.02  0.08  0.16  0.10  0.12 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
In (0-,)  0.52  0.60  0.50  0.59  0.52 
(0.29)  (0.31)  (0.30)  (0.31)  (0.31) 
Dividend  control  -0.10  -0.07  -0.07  - 0.08  -0.09 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Sumtnary statistic 
R2  0.41  0.34  0.41  0.33  0.34 
Sum of squared 
residuals  7972  8891  8033  9106  8918 
Durbin-Watson  2.04  2.11  2.09  2.08  2.07 
Source: Author's  estimates  of equation  5. See text description. 
a. All equations  are  estimated  by ordinary  least  squares  using  annual  data.  The  dependent  variable  in each  equation 
is the percent  change  in real  dividend  payments  by domestic  corporations,  defined  as A In  (Dt).  Independent  variables 
are defined  as follows:  corporate  accounting  earnings,  A In (Yt)  and In (Yt 1),  is corporate  profits  in the NIPA;  the 
adjustments  to this variable  are described  in the text; the tax preference  parameter,  A In (0t)  and In (Ot- 1),  is from 
equation  6 in the text. The dividend  control  variable  equals  one in 1972-74.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
as well as the accounting  earnings  equation.  The estimates of the long- 
run  dividend  target  for this model are substantially  more  plausible  than 
those for the accounting earnings equation, since the elasticity of 
dividends  with respect to profits  is 0.50 as opposed to 0.15. 
In each equation, the estimates suggest relatively small short-run 
responses  to changes  in  profitability.  A 1  percent  increase  in  real  earnings 
raises real dividends  about  0.15 percent in the first  year, and even after 
three years dividends  increase no more than 0.35 percent. The results 
also suggest that dividend  control reduced  payout. Although  the point 
estimates vary across equations, dividend controls in the early 1970s 
appear  to have lowered  payout  by 7 percent  to 10  percent. James  M. Poterba  481 
These results suggest that the dividend  tax burden  affects dividend 
payments,  but they shed no light on the relative  efficacy of taxes at the 
firm  level as against  taxes on shareholders  in altering  payout  behavior. 
To explore this question, the equations are reestimated  for the period 
since 1935, which includes the Undistributed  Profits Tax.29  For the 
longer  sample  period  the data  needed  for many  of the profit  adjustments 
in table 5 are unavailable,  but adjustments  based on the CCA and IVA 
are still  feasible. 
Table 6 presents dividend models estimated for the longer period, 
excluding World War II. The first column under each profit concept 
reports  an equation  analogous  to that in table 5, although  for a longer 
sample period. As  in the postwar estimates, the unadjusted profit 
measure  is most successful in explaining  payout, and  the tax parameters 
are estimated  to have a powerful  effect on payout choices. A 1 percent 
change in 0 raises payout by 1.5 percent in the year when it occurs, 
approximately  twice the effect estimated  for the postwar sample. The 
second column under  each profit  concept disaggregates  the tax prefer- 
ence variable to allow separate effects for the component based on 
shareholder  taxes and the corporate  undistributed  profits tax. This is 
straightforward,  since 
(7)  ln (0k)  ln [  wit  (1  !1zI  ) (1- 
ln LIw  (1rn)  -  ln(1  T). 
The results suggest that an undistributed  profits  tax has a much larger 
short-run  impact  on dividend  payout  than  a shareholder  tax, but that its 
long-run  effect is much smaller. A 1 percentage point change in the 
marginal  rate of undistributed  profits  tax changes dividend  payments  4 
percent  to 5 percent  in the first  year. A change in shareholder  tax rates 
with  the same  impact  on 0 would raise payout 1 percent  in the first  year 
and  3 percent  to 4 percent  in the long run. 
29. Corporate  tax payments  during  the period  when the undistributed  profits  tax was 
in effect  were partly  determined  by payout  policy. Treating  tax payments  as endogenous 
and instrumenting  for after-tax  earnings  using actual  after-tax  profits  plus undistributed 
profits  tax revenues  does not alter  the estimates  reported  in table  6. 482  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 6.  Dividend Payout Models, 1935-86a 
Earnings  adjusted for 
Unadjusted earnings  CCA and IVA 
Independent  variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Constant  0.08  0.23  1.01  0.90 
(0.23)  (0.19)  (0.33)  (0.22) 
A In (Y,)  0.43  0.20  0.28  0.09 
(0.06)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
A ln (0)  1.62  . .  .  1.41  ... 
(0.50)  (0.60) 
Shareholder  ...  0.98  ...  1.00 
(0.38)  (0.37) 
Corporate  ...  4.59  ...  5.10 
(0.66)  (0.62) 
ln (D,_1)  -0.13  -0.11  -0.47  -0.32 
(0.09)  (0.08)  (0.12)  (0.07) 
ln (Y,_)  0.13  0.08  0.23  0.14 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
In  (0-,)  0.43  ...  0.85  ... 
(0.22)  (0.27) 
Shareholder  ...  0.42  ...  0.81 
(0.17)  (0.18) 
Corporate  . . .  -  0.18  . . .  -  0.38 
(0.69)  (0.67) 
Dividend  control  - 0.13  - 0.10  - 0.05  - 0.08 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.64  0.82  0.49  0.83 
Sum of squared 
residuals  2451  1238  3457  1146 
Durbin-Watson  1.80  1.82  2.05  2.08 
Source:  Author's estimates  of equation 5. See  text  description. 
a.  All equations are estimated by ordinary least squares using annual data. The dependent variable is real dividends, 
A In (Dt), as in table 5. The equations estimated  in columns  I and 3 are analogous to columns  I and 2 of table 5, and 
the independent  variables are as defined in table 5, note a. The remaining two  columns  include  a disaggregated tax 
preference  variable,  A In (0t) and In (Ot- 1), that allows  for separate effects  of  shareholder taxes  and the corporate 
tindistributed profits tax.  The dividend control variable equals  I in 1972-74.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
The extreme payout effects of the undistributed  profits  tax may be 
due to the transitory  nature  of the underlying  tax experiment.  Managers 
may  have understood  in 1936  that  the undistributed  profits  tax was likely 
to be short-lived;  if so, they would have gone to greater lengths to 
minimize  its effects than  if they had  perceived  the change  as permanent. 
In the short run, managers  have substantial  flexibility  in retiming  their James  M. Poterba  483 
investments  and  expenses. The payout  effects of a permanent  corporate 
undistributed  profits  tax would therefore  probably  be smaller  than the 
estimates  in table  6 suggest. 
The equations  reported  in tables 5 and 6 presume that the long-run 
dividend  target  is related  to corporate  profits.  Terry  Marsh  and Robert 
Merton  propose a different  approach  to modeling  the dividend  target.30 
Expanding  on Lintner's argument  that dividends are determined  by 
"permanent  earnings," they argue that share prices provide the best 
estimate of long-run  earning  prospects. While this market-determined 
forecast of future earnings has obvious merit, it has one important 
drawback  for studying  how tax changes affect dividends. Since stock 
prices equal the present discounted value of after-tax dividends on 
existing  corporate  capital,  an increase  in dividend  taxes will lower share 
values, even if the tax change has no effect on corporate  earnings.31 
Identifying  the total  effect of taxes on dividend  payout  therefore  requires 
specifying both the direct effect through  the tax parameters  and the 
indirect  effect through  stock market  revaluation.  Despite this shortcom- 
ing for addressing  the tax question, dividend  equations  based on share 
prices  can nevertheless  provide  useful  evidence on the robustness  of the 
link  between  taxes and  payout  policy. 
Table 7 presents dividend payout equations including  the level and 
change in the real value of the stock market, defined as ln (S,  1) and 
A  (In  S,), measured  by the Standard  and  Poor's Composite  Index  divided 
by the GNP deflator.32  Including  the stock market  variables  improves 
the explanatory  power of the dividend  models, but it does not alter the 
basic conclusions  regarding  the long-run  effects of dividend  taxes. The 
equation in column five, which includes stock market variables but 
excludes real earnings, implies a long-run  payout elasticity of slightly 
above 3. The estimates  from equations  including  both share  prices and 
earnings  suggest similar  long-run  effects. Although  adding  stock prices 
30. Terry  A. Marsh  and Robert  C. Merton, "Dividend  Behavior  for the Aggregate 
Stock  Market,"  Journal  of Business, vol. 60 (January  1987),  pp. 1-40. 
31. A dividend  tax increase  reduces share values in either the tax-capitalization  or 
traditional  views  described  above.  Further  discussion  of this  issue may  be found  in Poterba 
and  Summers,  "Economic  Effects." 
32. To avoid obvious simultaneity  problems,  the change in real dividends  between 
years  t and  t -  1  is related  to the change  in real  stock  market  values  between  the beginning 
of years t and t -  1, and the level of the market  at the beginning  of period  t -  1. The 
variable  ln (S,)  is therefore  the beginning-of-period  real  stock market  value. 484  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 7.  Dividend Payout Models with Share Prices as Permanent Earning Measure, 
1948-86 
Profit measure 
Independent  Profits adjusted for  CCA  Profits adjuisted  for  Profits 
variable  and IVA  CCA, IVA, and pensions  excluided 
Constant  0.70  1.04  0.61  0.86  1.36 
(0.43)  (0.54)  (0.41)  (0.49)  (0.41) 
A ln(Y,)  0.11  0.05  0.15  0.10 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
A In (0)  0.64  0.82  0.63  0.81  -0.20 
(0.39)  (0.42)  (0.37)  (0.39)  (0.38) 
A In(S,)  ..0.13  ...  0.12  0.17 
(0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
In (D,_)  -0.21  -0.27  -0.32  -0.35  -0.30 
(0. 10)  (0.12)  (0. 1 1)  (0.12)  (0. 10) 
In (Y,_)  0.08  0.05  0.16  0.15 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07) 
In (0-)  0.60  0.87  0.50  0.71  1.09 
(0.31)  (0.41)  (0.30)  (0.39)  (0.33) 
In (St)  ...  0.02  ...  0.01  0.04 
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Dividend  control  -0.07  -0.08  -  0.07  -  0.08  -  0.10 
(0.04)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Summary statistic 
R2  0.34  0.42  0.41  0.49  0.41 
Sum of squared 
residuals  8891  7804  8033  6939  8044 
Durbin-Watson  2.11  2.28  2.09  2.37  2.30 
Source: Author's  estimates.  See text description. 
a. All equations  are  estimated  by ordinary  least  squares  using  annual  data.  The  dependent  variable  is real  dividends, 
A In  (Dt),  as described  in table  5, note a. The independent  variables  are defined  as follows:  lagged  real  dividends,  In 
(Dt- ); corporate  earnings,  A In  (Yt)  and  In (Yt 1),  is corporate  profits  in the NIPA (the adjustments  to this variable 
are described  in the text); the tax preference  parameter,  A In (0t)  and In (0,_  ), is from  equation  6 in the text; the 
level, In (S,-  ), and change,  A In (St), in the real value of the stock market,  measured  by the Standard  and Poor's 
Composite  Index  divided  by the GNP deflator.  The variable  In  (St)  is real stock market  value  at the beginning  of the 
period.  The dividend  control  variable  equals I in 1972-74.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses. 
to equations with earnings improves their fit, the equation with only 
stock prices has explanatory  power comparable  to that of an equation 
with earnings  adjusted  for CCA, IVA, and  pension contributions.33 
All of the payout  models  estimated  above  focus on links  between  cash 
flow  and  payout,  but  ignore  the demand  for  undistributed  profits  induced 
by corporate  investment. We used two strategies to control for these 
33. A non-nested  hypothesis  test of two exclusive  models,  one including  only  earnings 
and  the other  only share  prices,  rejects  earnings  with  CCA  and  IVA  in  favor  of share  prices 
but  does not reject  pension-adjusted  earnings. James  M. Poterba  485 
effects. First, we added  a measure  of the effective tax rate on corporate 
investment to the earnings-based  payout models.34  This variable was 
statistically  insignificant  in each of the equations, and its inclusion did 
not alter the estimated tax effects. Second, we added a measure of 
Tobin's q, the value of outstanding  debt and equity divided by the 
replacement  cost of corporate assets, to the payout models. The q 
variable  should reflect the investment opportunities  facing firms. The 
change in q was positively related  to the change in real dividends, and 
there  was evidence  for  a small  negative  steady-state  effect  of q on payout. 
The results  were not precise enough  to warrant  reporting,  however. 
The equations  presented  above consider  how tax changes affect the 
level of cash dividends. They provide no evidence on how tax reform 
might alter nondividend distributions such as share repurchases. A 
similar model could be applied to repurchases, although the earlier 
discussion  of the changing  institutional  environment  in  the 1980s  suggests 
that the model's parameters  are unlikely to be stable throughout  the 
postwar  period.  To  provide  some  evidence  on noncash  payout,  however, 
an equation  similar  to that in table 5, column three, was estimated  for 
aggregate  share  repurchases  (Re)  during  1948-86.35 
(8)  A  ln (R)  - 4.72 +  2.23 A  ln (Yt)  +  5.26  A  ln (0)  -  0.48 ln (R1) 
(5.39)  (1.08)  (6.65)  (0.28) 
+  1.06Iln(Y,1)  -  O.16In(01)  +  0.50 DIVCON, 
(0.89)  (5.40)  (0.58) 
R2=  0.29;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.45. 
Higher  earnings  increase repurchases,  and the point estimates suggest 
that  raising  the dividend  tax burden  increases steady-state  share  repur- 
chases. The standard  errors  on the tax variables,  however, are too large 
to permit  any reliable  conclusions. 
34. Effective  tax  rate  series  for 1953-85  were  drawn  from  Alan  J. Auerbach  and  James 
R. Hines, Jr., "Anticipated  Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment," in Martin 
Feldstein, ed.,  The Effects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation  (University  of Chicago 
Press, 1987),  p. 177. 
35. The  aggregate  time  series  for share  repurchases  was calculated  by multiplying  the 
ratio  of share  repurchases  to cash  dividends  for  New York  Stock  Exchange  firms  included 
on the CRSP  data  tapes  by the value  of cash dividend  payments  by domestic  corporations 
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The results of the dividend  payout models in this section leave little 
doubt that changes in the relative  tax burdens  on dividends  and capital 
gains affect the fraction of corporate  earnings  that are distributed  to 
shareholders.  They reject  the tax-capitalization  view, in which changes 
in after-tax  earnings  translate  dollar  for dollar  into changes in payout, 
and provide estimates of the dynamic  adjustments  that follow tax and 
profit  shocks. These estimates  can be used to illustrate  the effects of the 
Tax Reform  Act on corporate  payout  and saving.36 
The Payout Effects of the Tax Reform Act 
The Tax Reform  Act affects corporate  saving in at least three ways. 
First, it raises average  corporate  tax rates and  thereby  reduces  after-tax 
income available  for either  dividends  or retentions. Second, it changes 
the tax treatment  of dividends  and makes them more attractive  relative 
to capital  gains. Finally, it alters the relative tax burdens  on debt and 
equity financing,  thereby  affecting  the share  of pretax  corporate  profits 
that  will be devoted  to equity  holders  as opposed  to lenders.  This section 
describes  these three  tax changes  in more  detail  and  then  illustrates  their 
potential effects on corporate  saving. The analysis is partial  in that it 
ignores many other provisions of the tax reform.37  The tax reform's 
reduction  in investment  incentives, for example, raises the tax burden 
on new investment  and  may  further  reduce  corporate  saving. 
CORPORATE  TAX  PAYMENTS 
Although the Tax Reform Act reduces the statutory  corporate  tax 
rate  from  46 to 34 percent, a variety  of provisions, including  elimination 
36. The dynamic  paths described  below must be viewed with caution. Most of the 
sample  variation  in after-tax  earnings  arises from movements  in corporate  profitability, 
not  from  tax  changes.  The  estimated  dynamics  may  therefore  fail  to describe  the  adjustment 
path  following  a tax increase. If managers  resist cutting  dividends  after  the Tax Reform 
Act takes effect, then the Tax Reform  Act will lead to a larger  corporate  saving  reaction 
than  that predicted  by the equations.  There  is unfortunately  no way to resolve this issue 
given  the available  data. 
37. The analysis assumes that relative prices do not adjust  at all during  the years 
immediately  after  tax reform,  so that higher  tax burdens  on the corporate  sector are not 
offset by increased  cash flows. A more  complete  analysis  would  relax  this assumption. James  M. Poterba  487 
of the investment tax credit, strengthening  of the corporate  minimum 
tax, lengthening  of depreciation  lifetimes, and changes in accounting 
provisions,  raise total corporate  tax payments.  The first  column  of table 
8 shows the projected  tax increases, measured  in 1986  dollars,  between 
1987  and 1989.38  Increased  tax liabilities  will exert downward  pressure 
on corporate  saving, although  they may be partly  offset by changes in 
dividend  payout.  Estimates  for  the effect of changes  in after-tax  earnings 
from  the payout equation  in the third  column  of table 5 suggest  that the 
increase in corporate  taxes will reduce dividends  by $1.9 billion, $4.8 
billion, and $8.4 billion (1986  dollars)  in the years 1987-89.  The payout 
reduction  therefore offsets roughly one-third  of the corporate tax in- 
crease by 1989. The drop in corporate  saving in 1989  would be about 
$16.2 billion, assuming  changes in marginal  taxes on dividends  do not 
affect payout  decisions. 
CHANGES  IN  PAYOUT  INCENTIVES 
The Tax Reform Act lowers marginal  dividend tax rates for most 
individual  investors while raising  the tax burden  on capital  gains. Both 
changes  will encourage  firms  to raise their payout rates, compounding 
the negative corporate saving effect of higher corporate taxes. The 
National  Bureau  of Economic  Research's  TAXSIM  model  indicates  that 
the weighted  average marginal  tax rate on household dividend  income 
will decline from 33.4 percent to 25.3 percent as a result of the tax 
change. Marginal  dividend tax rates on most other investors are not 
affected  by the reform.39 
Determining  the reform's  impact  on capital  gains  tax burdens  is more 
difficult, since, for two reasons, the effective and statutory rates of 
capital  gains  tax facing  individuals  differ  significantly.  First, taxation  on 
realization  rather  than  accrual  reduces the effective tax burden.  For an 
asset held twenty years with an annual  rate of return  of 6 percent, with 
38. The  Tax  Reform  Act raises  corporate  taxes by more  during  the  few years  following 
the reform  than  in the steady state. A more  detailed  discussion  may be found  in Alan J. 
Auerbach and James M. Poterba, "Why Have Corporate  Revenues Declined," in 
Summers,  ed., Tax  Policy and the  Economy,  pp. 1-28. 
39. The tax reform changes many tax provisions relating  to banks and insurance 
companies.  These  changes,  typically  involving  the minimum  tax, are  likely  to raise  the tax 
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Table 8.  Effects of 1986 Tax Reform Act on Corporate Saving,  1986-89 
Billions  of  1986 dollars 
Predicted  Combined effect  on dividends  Combined 
change  in  Tax  Marginal  effect  on 
corporate  parameter  Corporate  dividend  corporate 
Year  taxes  (0)  tax  tax  Total  saving 
1986  0  0.78  0  0  0  0 
1987  31.7  0.83  -  1.9  3.1  1.1  -32.8 
1988  23.6  0.88  -4.8  10.6  5.8  -  29.4 
1989  24.6  0.88  -  8.4  20.6  12.2  -  36.8 
Sources: The estimated  tax changes  in column I are drawn  from  Joseph Wakefield,  "The Tax Reform  Act of 
1986,"  Survey  of Current  Business,  vol. 67 (March  1987),  pp. 18-25. Entries  in column  2 are calculated  using the 
NBER TAXSIM  model to estimate  the household  tax burden  after tax reform,  along with the post-tax reform 
statutory  rates on other investor  classes. Predicted  dividend  changes  are the author's  calculations  based on the 
dividend  payout  model  in table  5, column  3. See text for further  details.  The baseline  values are corporate  profits, 
after  adjustment  for CCA  and  IVA and  pension  contributions,  $186.5  billion,  and  domestic  dividend  payments,  $76.2 
billion. 
a statutory  capital  gains tax rate of 33 percent, the accrual  equivalent 
tax rate is only 22 percent. At a holding  period of forty years, the rate 
falls to 15  percent.  Second, a large  share  of capital  gains  escapes taxation 
entirely  because it is bequeathed  (and  therefore  has its tax basis stepped 
up), donated to charity, or never reported to the IRS. As a result, 
households' effective accrual capital gains rate is much less than the 
statutory  rate;  a ratio  of one-fourth  is assumed  in  the  calculations  below.40 
The Tax Reform Act also raises corporations'  capital gains tax rate, 
from  28 to 34 percent. 
The net effect of these changes on corporate payout incentives is 
summarized  by 0, the dividend  tax preference  factor, which was 0.78 in 
1986.  Using the 1988  marginal  tax rates on each investor  class and their 
equity ownership  weights for 1986, we calculate that 0 will be 0.88 in 
1988.  The estimates of the payout function in table 6, column 3, imply 
that this shift  will lead to an 8.1 percent  increase  in corporate  dividends 
when the new law takes effect, and  to a 20 percent  dividend  increase  in 
the long run. 
The  third  and  fourth  columns  of table  8 show  the  tax  reform'  s predicted 
effect on both dividends  and  corporate  saving. As time elapses after  the 
tax reform,  payout  rises as marginal  dividend  tax reductions  exert  a large 
40. Further  evidence  on the relationship  between  statutory  and  effective capital  gains 
tax rates  is provided  in James  M. Poterba,  "How Burdensome  Are Capital  Gains  Taxes: 
Evidence  from  the United  States," Journal  of Public  Economics,  vol. 33 (July  1987),  pp. 
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effect. The increase in corporate  tax burdens  reduces corporate  divi- 
dends, however, so the net effect is smaller  than the pure dividend  tax 
change  would  imply.  In each year  after  the tax change,  corporate  saving 
is substantially  below its level in the absence of tax reform;  by 1989,  the 
tax-related  decline in corporate  saving  is 1.  1 percent  of NNP. 
CHANGES  IN  LEVERAGE  INCENTIVES 
The Tax Reform  Act also affects the relative  desirability  of debt and 
equity financing.  The calculations in table 8 hold corporate leverage 
constant, because predicting  a change is difficult. The new law has 
different  effects on the incentives  for debt  finance  facing  different  firms, 
and  its net effect is unclear. 
Firms  that  previously  faced a marginal  tax rate  of 46 percent  will find 
their  tax rates reduced  to 34 percent or, if they enter the minimum  tax 
regime,  20 percent. For these firms,  the tax incentives associated with 
leverage will fall. The situation is reversed for firms that face higher 
marginal  tax rates. Since  1981, the combined effects of depressed 
corporate  profits  and accelerated  depreciation  allowances have gener- 
ated negative  taxable income for many corporations.  Some firms  have 
been  able  to claim  tax  refunds  by carrying  their  losses back  and  offsetting 
previous tax payments, but approximately  one-third  of all firms have 
exhausted  their  carryback  potential  and  generated  loss carryforwardsi.4 
For many  of these firms,  reduced  depreciation  allowances  coupled  with 
the strengthened  minimum  tax will cause a return  to tax-paying  status  at 
either a 34 percent or 20 percent marginal  rate. These firms now face 
larger  corporate  tax incentives  for borrowing. 
The net tax benefit  to corporate  financing  through  debt as opposed to 
equity  depends  on  both  corporate  and  investor  tax  rates  .42 For  an  investor 
facing tax rates min.t  m, and z on interest income,  dividends, and capital 
gains,  respectively,  debt finance  is more  attractive  than  equity if 
(9)  (1  -  min  >  (I  -  T) [U(I  -  m)  +  (1  -  U)(1  -  z)], 
where ox  is the dividend payout rate. Table 9 presents illustrative 
41. An estimate  of the incidence  of tax loss carryforwards  based on a sophisticated 
imputation  procedure  using unpublished  IRS data is reported  in Rosanne  Altshuler  and 
Alan  Auerbach,  "The Significance  of Tax Loss Carryforwards"  (University  of Pennsyl- 
vania,  1987). 
42. This point is elaborated  by Merton H. Miller, "Debt and Taxes," Journal of 
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Table 9.  Changes in Leverage Incentives Due to 1986 Tax Reform Act 
After-tax  inicomne  fromn  debt finance 
minius after-tax inicome  from 
equity finance  (per dollar 
of corporate  earnings)a 
Before  Tax  After Tax 
Investor  tax status  Firm tax status  Reformn  Act  Reformn  Act  Change 
Taxable  at top marginal  Fully taxable 
rate  0.11  0.17  0.06 
Taxable at top marginal  Fully taxable before TRA, 
rate  minimum tax after TRA  0.11  0.06  -0.05 
Taxable  at top marginal  Loss  carryforward before 
rate  TRA,  minimum tax 
after TRA  -0.23  0.06  0.29 
Tax-exempt  Fully taxable  0.46  0.34  -0.12 
Tax-exempt  Fully taxable before TRA, 
minimum tax after TRA  0.46  0.20  -0.26 
Tax-exempt  Loss  carryforward before 
TRA,  minimum tax 
after TRA  0.00  0.20  0.20 
Middle-incomeb  Fully taxable  0.26  0.18  -0.08 
Middle-incomeb  Fully taxable before TRA, 
minimum tax after TRA  0.26  0.06  -0.20 
Middle-incomeb  Loss  carryforward before 
TRA,  minimum tax 
after TRA  -0.13  0.06  0.19 
Source: Authors'  calculations.  See text. 
a. All equity  calculations  assume  that  dividends  equal  half  of earnings  available  for common  shareholders. 
b. Adjusted  gross income  of $40,000.  The marginal  tax rate  for a family  of four  with  an adjusted  gross income  of 
$40,000  is 0.28 before  and after  the Tax Reform  Act takes  effect. 
calculations  of the relative tax burdens  on debt and equity finance for 
different  types of investors and firms, both before and after the Tax 
Reform Act. Depending  upon the characteristics  of the investors and 
firms  under  consideration,  the tax incentive  to use equity finance  either 
rises under the new law or declines. The tax reform's net effect on 
leverage depends on the relative importance  of the investors and firms 
in various  situations.  Analyzing  the changes  in corporate  borrowing  that 
will occur  as a result  of the Tax  Reform  Act requires  detailed  information 
on both investor  and  firm  characteristics  and is an important  project  for 
future  study. 
The dividend  payout  models  estimated  in the last section suggest  that 
the Tax Reform Act may have a sizable impact on corporate saving. 
Three years after the new law takes effect, it may reduce corporate 
saving  by 1 percent of NNP, a change as large as the drop  in corporate James  M. Poterba  491 
saving  between the 1970s  and 1980s. Even a conservative calculation, 
cutting the sensitivity of payout to dividend tax rates by half, would 
imply more than a $25 billion decline in net corporate  saving. The key 
question  for  evaluating  these changes  is whether  personal  saving  is likely 
to offset declining  corporate  saving. 
Does Corporate Saving Affect Household Saving? 
Since corporate  assets are ultimately  owned by households, changes 
in corporate  saving  induce  changes  in household  net worth. A revenue- 
neutral  tax  reform  that  reduces  corporate  saving  but  increases  household 
disposable  income can therefore  leave total private  saving  unchanged  if 
individuals  adjust  their saving plans to offset the change in corporate 
saving.43  A variety of considerations, related both to constraints on 
consumers  and to corporate  financial  behavior, may lead to imperfect 
saving  offsets through  this channel. 
The effect of a change  in corporate  saving  on private  saving  depends 
on the source of the change in corporate saving. Many shocks to 
corporate  saving  move  personal  saving  in  the same  direction.  If corporate 
saving increases because of an improvement  in the productivity of 
corporate  capital, for example, the rate of return  available  to private 
investors  will also change. Corporate  saving  and  personal  saving  would 
likely  both  rise. Other  shocks might  imply  different  correlations. 
For owners of corporate  stock, the new tax policy reduces taxes on 
personal  account  and  raises imputed  taxes through  the corporate  sector. 
If high-income  households  that  own corporate  stock successfully  pierce 
the corporate  veil, their  saving  decisions  will reflect  both their  change  in 
personal tax liability and the present discounted value of changes in 
corporate taxes paid by companies they own.  Since 85 percent of 
common stock is held by individuals  in the top decile of the wealth 
distribution,  and  43 percent  is held by those in the top 0.5 percent  of the 
wealth distribution,  consumption adjustments  by equity holders are 
unlikely to be affected by liquidity  constraints  or other credit market 
43. The  argument  for studying  only the private  sector  budget  constraint  and  assuming 
complete  saving  offset is presented  in Merton  H. Miller  and Charles  W. Upton, Macro- 
economics:  A Neoclassical  Introduction (University  of Chicago Press,  1986), especially 
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imperfections.44  Equity owners may nevertheless not respond in the 
same way to capital  gains and other types of disposable  income; in this 
case, consumption  may  be affected  by a tax change  that  raises  disposable 
income. 
A revenue-neutral  tax reform  may also have a second effect, redis- 
tributing  wealth  from  the owners  of corporate  stock to other  individuals. 
There is no reason to expect the change in imputed corporate tax 
liabilities to balance exactly the change in personal liabilities on a 
household-by-household  basis.45  Even if households  that  own corporate 
stock pierce the corporate  veil and  adjust  their  consumption  in response 
to their net tax liability, transfers between shareowners and other 
households  may affect  private  saving.46 
THE  CASE  AGAINST  THE  CORPORATE  VEIL 
The argument  that  households  offset changes  in corporate  saving  can 
be illustrated  in a standard  representative-consumer  setting in which 
lump  sum  taxes on firms  are reduced  and  lump  sum  taxes on households 
are increased. The household chooses consumption  to maximize the 
discounted  sum of utilities, subject  to the budget  constraint 
00  OC 
(10)  E  (1 +  r)-iCt  j =  ,  (1 +  r)  -(wLt+j  -  TPt+j) +  Vt, 
j=0  j=O 
where Ct denotes consumption outlays, wLt is pretax labor income, 
TPt denotes direct taxes levied on the household, and V, is the market 
value of corporate  equities at time t. The value of corporate equities 
equals the present discounted  value of corporate  dividends  on existing 
capital  assets: 
(11)  Vt =  ,  (PROFt+j -  TCt+j)(1 +  r)-i, 
j=O 
44. Avery and Elliehausen, "Financial  Characteristics  of High Income Families," 
p. 174. 
45. Detailed  information  on the incidence  of the  Tax  Reform  Act's change  in corporate 
tax burdens  is provided  by Martin  Feldstein, "Imputing  Corporate  Tax Liabilities  to 
Individual  Taxpayers," Working  Paper  2349 (National  Bureau  of Economic Research, 
August  1987). 
46. If equity holders exhibit lower marginal  propensities  to consume than other 
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where  PROFis corporate  profits  and  TCt  denotes  corporate  profit  taxes.47 
Substituting  equation 11 into equation 10 shows that the household 
budget constraint  is unaffected  by tax shifts that preserve the present 
value of government  revenue: 
00  00 
(12)  ,  (1 +  r)-jCt+j  =  ,  (1 +  r)-j(wLt+j  + PROFj+1)  j=O  j=O 
-  ,  (1 +  r)-J (TCt+j +  TPt+J). 
j=o 
This equation  provides the basis for the Ricardian  equivalence debate 
about whether households recognize discounted streams  of future tax 
liabilities.  It also demonstrates  that  tax perturbations  that  affect the mix 
of TC  and TP in various years without altering  the sum of the two tax 
components  in any year should  therefore  have no effect on consumption 
decisions. These changes alter the composition of the household's 
income stream  but not its level. 
The  consumption  effect  of a switch  from  personal  to corporate  taxation 
(so dTCt+1  =  -  dTPt+j)  is given by 
(13)  dC~  =  ~0(  dCt  dC,dtP  (13)  dCtj=O  \dTPt+J  dTCt+j 
P 
=cWE  (1 +  r)-JdTPt+j -  ccgd  Vt. 
j=o 
Provided that households face no liquidity constraints and perceive 
changes  in equity  values as permanent  shocks, the marginal  propensity 
to consume out of changes in the present discounted value of labor 
income (c,,) is the same as that out of changes in capital gains (ccg).  If 
dVtIdTCt+j  =  (1 +  r)  -j, then the tax switch will not affect saving. 
There are reasons for suspecting  that each of these conditions may 
fail, however, and that a tax reform that reduces corporate saving 
by one dollar may raise household saving either more or less than 
that amount. Two sets of arguments  for this view, one implying  that 
dVtIdTCt+j  is not equal to (1 +  r)-j and the other suggesting  that the 
propensities  to consume  out of different  types of income may differ,  are 
described  in the sections that  follow. 
47. This  illustration  assumes  that  there  are no dividend  taxes, only lump  sums. 494  Brookings Papers  on Econtomic Activity,  2:1987 
WEAVING  THE  CORPORATE  VEIL:  CORPORATE  CONSIDERATIONS 
Changes  in average  corporate  tax burdens  alter  the supply  of retained 
earnings  available  to managers.  If the marginal  projects  undertaken  by 
managers  yield the market  rate of return, then tax-induced  shocks to 
free cash flow will affect share values dollar-for-dollar.  But recent 
theories of corporate capital structure and its effect on investment 
decisions question whether marginal  projects indeed yield the market 
rate  of return. 
At least since the work of Adolph Berle and Gardner  Means, there 
has  been  concern  that  managers  with  an  ample  supply  of retained  earnings 
would  invest these funds  in projects  that  yield below-market  rates.48  The 
central  problem  of corporate  control, on this view, is the shareholders' 
need to prevent  managers  from  choosing  the quiet  life and  misallocating 
resources. The recent wave of corporate  takeovers  has generated  much 
discussion  of the problems  of corporate  control.  Michael  Jensen, chron- 
icling  the growth  of free cash flow in several  takeover-prone  industries, 
argues that managerial  reluctance  to return  cash to investors, coupled 
with a proclivity  to continue  investing  in familiar  industries  even though 
potential  returns  had declined, yielded  below-market  returns  for corpo- 
rate shareholders.49  Although the empirical  evidence on this issue is 
difficult to evaluate, studies of ex post rates of return suggest that 
internally  financed  projects yield lower returns  than those financed  by 
external  borrowing  or new share  issues.S0 
If managers  invest retentions  in projects yielding below-market  re- 
turns, then for the tax experiment  described above, share values will 
decline by less than the full increase in corporate  taxes. An increase in 
48. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner  L. Means, The Modern Corporation  and 
Private P-operty (Macmillan, 1932). 
49. Michael Jensen, "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate  Finance, and 
Takeovers,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 76 (May 1986),  pp. 323-29. Evidence  on 
the misallocation  of free cash flow  in the oil industry  is provided  by E. Allen  Jacobs, "The 
Agency Costs of Corporate  Control" (Sloan School of Management,  Massachusetts 
Institute  of Technology,  1986). 
50. The most widely cited study of how financial  policy affects the rate of return  is 
William  J. Baumol,  Peggy Heim, Burton  G. Malkiel,  and Richard  E. Quandt,  "Earnings 
Retention,  New Capital,  and  the  Growth  of the  Firm,"  Review  ofEconomics  and Statistics, 
vol. 52 (November  1970),  pp. 345-55. Similar  evidence  is reported  in Auerbach,  "Taxes, 
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corporate  taxes will be partly financed  by lower levels of malragerial 
misappropriation,  so higher  corporate  taxes combat a preexisting  dis- 
tortion  in the market  for corporate  control. Even if households  exhibit 
equal  rnarginal  propensities  to consume out of capital  gains and dispos- 
able income, a revenue-neutral  increase  in corporate  tax burdens  could 
therefore  raise  consumption. 
A second line of argument  regarding  the difference  between internal 
and  external  finance,  however, suggests  a different  conclusion. If inter- 
nally  and  externally  financed  projects  yield different  returns  not because 
managers  misappropriate  funds,  but  because  the imperfect  observability 
of new project  quality  leads external  financiers  to demand  rates  of return 
above the investors' discount rates to compensate  for the risk of being 
lured into unprofitable  projects, then higher corporate tax burdens 
compound  a preexisting  distortion. For firms  that face higher  costs of 
funds when they rely on external project finance rather  than retained 
earnings, a reduction in free cash flow may reduce investment."1  In- 
creased average tax burdens exacerbate the need to raise external 
finance.  If firms  consequently  forgo  new  projects  that  would  be profitable 
if evaluated using the shareholders'  discount rate, then a one dollar 
increase  in corporate  taxes may reduce share  values by more than one 
dollar, reflecting  the firm's reduced access to a source of investment 
finance  that  avoids a costly market  imperfection. 
Each of these two scenarios may apply to some firms, but which 
predominates  is unclear.  Whether  the net change  in the market  value of 
corporate  equity diverges substantially  from the increase in corporate 
taxes is difficult  to test, since in practice  corporate  tax reforms  are not 
lump sum levies. Actual tax changes affect incentives for investment 
and other aspects of corporate behavior, so assessing the valuation 
effects of tax reform  requires  a complete model of corporate  behavior. 
WEAVING  THE  CORPORATE  VEIL:  HOUSEHOLD  CONSIDERATIONS 
Even if the stock market  reacts dollar-for-dollar  to changes  in corpo- 
rate taxes, household saving may not completely offset movements in 
51. Recent  empirical  evidence  on  the  importance  of retained earnings  forthe  investment 
decisions of small and growing  firms  has been provided  by Steven Fazzari, R. Glenn 
Hubbard,  and Bruce Petersen, "Financing Constraints  and Corporate  Investment" 
(Northwestern  University,  1987).  These  authors  present  evidence  that  the  marginal  returns 
from  additional  retentions-financed  projects  may  be very high,  at least for small  firms. 496  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
corporate  saving. Households  may exhibit  different  marginal  propensi- 
ties to save out of different  types of income. They may not believe that 
changes  in asset values  are  permanent,  but  rather  treat  them  as transitory 
''paper  gains.''52  Households may have lower marginal  propensities  to 
consume  out of such perceived  transitory  wealth  increments  than  out of 
income shocks  that  are  perceived  to be more  permanent,  such  as changes 
in dividends."3 
An alternative explanation for different aggregate propensities to 
consume out of different  kinds of income is that the households that 
receive capital  gains have different  saving  propensities  from those that 
depend primarily  on labor income. In this case a tax change with no 
redistributive  consequences would have no effect. Tax changes that 
redistribute  income from households with equity holdings to those 
without  such  assets could  affect saving,  however, even if each  household 
completely pierces the corporate  veil with respect to the corporate  tax 
liability  of the firms  that  it owns. 
Interhousehold  differences in saving propensities may arise from 
factors that affect saving propensities  at all ages as well as from life- 
cycle considerations.  Variation  in rates of time-preference  or bequest 
motives could explain  saving  differences  that  persist  throughout  the life 
cycle. Households with lower time-preference  rates will consume less 
in their  early  years  and  acquire  a larger  stock of wealth  at the peak of the 
life-cycle trajectory  than will households with higher time-preference 
rates. Asset  holders will therefore have a higher saving rate than 
recipients of labor income, as in the growth models developed by 
Nicholas Kaldor  and others.S4  Revenue-neutral  increases in corporate 
52. The question of whether  households  consume at the same rate out of different 
types of income  has a long  empirical  history;  see, for example,  Lester  D. Taylor,  "Saving 
out of Different  Types of Income," BPEA, 2:1971, pp. 383-415. Several  recent studies 
have suggested  that a substantial  fraction  of common stock returns  may be transitory. 
These studies include Eugene Fama and Kenneth  French, "Transitory  and Permanent 
Components  in Stock  Prices,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  forthcoming;  and  James  M. 
Poterba  and Lawrence  H. Summers,  "Mean Reversion  in Stock Prices: Evidence and 
Implications,"  Working  Paper 2343 (National Bureau  of Economic Research, August 
1987).  This may explain  some differences  in marginal  propensity  to consume  from stock 
market  capital  gains  and  other  income. 
53. The  marginal  propensity  to consume  out of capital  gains  may  depend  on the source 
of capital  gains. If households  perceive declines in share  values as the result of the tax 
change,  they may adjust  their  consumption  more  than  to other  types of capital  gains  and 
losses on the grounds  that  these are  relatively  permanent  gains  or losses. 
54. Nicholas Kaldor, "Alternative  Theories of Distribution,"  Review of Economic James  M. Poterba  497 
taxation will therefore  reduce private saving, since they place higher 
burdens  on high-saving  households. 
Life-cycle differences  in saving behavior  may alter  this result. Most 
assets are held by older individuals,  who might  be expected to have a 
low marginal  propensity  to save. A corporate  tax increase  that reduces 
the value of the corporate  capital  stock therefore  transfers  wealth  away 
from  households  with  high  marginal  propensities  to consume,  potentially 
raising  saving. The net effect of a revenue-neutral  reform  depends on 
the distribution  of equity  ownership  and  the magnitude  of the differences 
in consumption  propensities. The next subsection presents empirical 
evidence that attempts  to estimate how corporate  and personal saving 
interact. 
DOES  PERSONAL  SAVING  RESPOND  TO  CORPORATE  SAVING? 
EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE 
Nearly three decades ago, Edward Denison observed that gross 
private saving is more stable than either personal or corporate  gross 
saving.55  He interpreted  that  stability  as evidence  of substantial  offsetting 
between  personal  and corporate  saving. A number  of subsequent  econ- 
ometric studies have supported Denison's conclusion, typically by 
including  retained earnings in reduced-form  household consumption 
functions  and  then  testing  whether  the coefficient  on this variable  equals 
that on disposable income.56  Failure to reject this hypothesis is inter- 
Studies,  vol. 23 (1955-56),  pp. 83-100. A more  recent  discussion  is Stephen  A. Marglin, 
Growth Distribution and Prices (Harvard University  Press,  1984). 
55. Edward  F. Denison, "A Note on Private Saving," Review of Economics and 
Statistics,  vol. 40 (August 1958), pp. 261-67. 
56. Among  the recent  econometric  studies  that cannot  find  a corporate  veil are Paul 
A. David and John L. Scadding,  "Private Savings: Ultrarationality,  Aggregation,  and 
Denison's  Law," Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol. 82 (March-April  1974),  pp. 225-49; 
E. Philip Howrey and Saul H.  Hymans, "The Measurement  and Determination  of 
Loanable-Funds  Saving,"  BPEA,  3:1978,  pp. 655-705;  Martin  S. Feldstein, "Tax Incen- 
tives, Corporate  Saving, and Capital  Accumulation  in the United States," Journal of 
Public Economics, vol. 2 (April 1973), pp. 159-71; and George M. von Furstenberg, 
"Saving,"  in Henry  J. Aaron  and  Joseph  A. Pechman,  eds., How Taxes  Affect  Economic 
Behavior  (Brookings,  1981),  pp. 327-90. Two studies  analyzing  the U.S. time series that 
find  less  than  complete  offset  of personal  forcorporate  saving  are  Kul  B. Bhatia,  "Corporate 
Taxation,  Retained  Earnings,  and  Capital  Formation,"  Journal  of Public  Economics,  vol. 
11  (February  1979),  pp. 123-34;  and  Patric  Hendershott  and  Joe Peek, "Private  Saving  in 
the United States, 1950-1985," Working  Paper 2294 (National Bureau of Economic 
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preted as evidence for the view that households pierce the corporate 
veil. 
Previous  studies  are  difficult  to evaluate.  Some focus on gross saving, 
providing  little evidence for a discussion of net saving behavior. Only 
one adjusts measured  corporate  saving for inflationary  revaluations  in 
corporate debt, and none corrects for mismeasurement  of pension 
contributions.  The most important  shortcoming  of previous  work, how- 
ever, is the failure to treat corporate and personal saving as jointly 
endogenous  variables.  Many of the shocks that affect corporate  saving 
may affect personal saving as well. The validity of simple regression 
evidence on the correlation  between personal and corporate  saving is 
therefore  open to question. 
The only way to attack  the  joint endogeneity  problem  is to identify  a 
source  of exogenous  variation  in corporate  saving.  The empirical  results 
of the last section suggest  that changes  in dividend  tax policy affect the 
share  of corporate  earnings  that are retained.  These tax shocks provide 
a natural  instrument  for studying  how households react to changes in 
corporate  saving.  The model of saving  underlying  these tests is: 
(14a)  CORPSAVEt =  ZIt8I  +  Ot*82  +  Vlt 
and 
(14b)  PERSAVEt  = Z2tb3  + CORPSAVEt*84  +  V2t, 
where  Z, and  Z2  are  vectors  of other  exogenous  variables.  The  identifying 
assumption  for my tests is that shifts in the relative tax burdens on 
dividends and capital gains affect the level of personal saving only 
through  their  influence  on corporate  saving.57 
I used two different  approaches  to estimate the effect of corporate 
saving  on personal  saving.  The  first  involves  reduced-form  private  saving 
functions that relate private saving to the dividend tax variables that 
may shift  corporate  saving.  Finding  that  lower dividend  tax rates, which 
encourage  corporate  payout, reduce  total private  saving  would suggest 
that households do not pierce the corporate veil. The second testing 
strategy  includes  corporate  saving  and  other  corporate  cash flows in the 
57. Dividend  tax  changes  may  have  other  effects  on private  saving.  They  are  associated 
with changes  in the tax system  that  affect  the after-tax  return  to individual  investors.  The 
bias through  this channel  is likely to be small, however. For evidence that saving  is not 
particularly  sensitive  to changes  in  the rate  of return,  see Robert  E. Hall, "Consumption," 
Working  Paper  2265  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  May 1987). James  M. Poterba  499 
private  saving  equation.  This  provides  a more  direct  test of the hypothesis 
that the level of undistributed  profits or pension contributions  affects 
private saving. These equations are estimated both by ordinary  least 
squares and by instrumental  variables treating corporate saving as 
endogenous. 
The estimating  equation  in both tests relates  total  private  saving  at an 
annual  frequency to business conditions, demographic  variables that 
affect the economy's saving  propensity,  the stock of household  wealth 
at the beginning  of the year (NW,),  and  the flow of household  disposable 
income taking account of corporate cash flow. The latter measure, 
denoted YD*  for  augmented  disposable  income, equals  NIPA disposable 
income plus undistributed  corporate profits corrected by the capital 
consumption  and  inventory  valuation  adjustments.  Business conditions 
are  measured  using  the GNP  gap, and  demographic  patterns  are  captured 
with  a variable  for the fraction  of the population  aged  sixty-five  or older. 
The private saving equation is scaled by the level of augmented 
disposable  income to correct for possible heteroskedasticity  related  to 
the size of the economy. The reduced-form  equation  that underlies  the 
first  test of how tax policy affects total private  saving  is therefore:58 
(15)  (SAVEPRI)t  :-- Yo  ?' YIN 
W 
+Y2GAPt 
(15)  (  ~YD*  )=  ?+7(YD*)'+7GP 
+ Y3SHARE65t  + 'Y40t  +  V3t 
Equation  15  was estimated  with and without  a time trend, which never 
had a statistically  significant  coefficient. The results are therefore  pre- 
sented without the trend variable. The equations were also estimated 
with measures  of ex post real interest rates included, but this variable 
also had a small and statistically  insignificant  effect and was therefore 
deleted. 
The results  of estimating  the reduced-form  equation  for the post-1948 
period  are shown  on the following  page. The estimates  correct  for first- 
58. The standard  aggregate  consumption  function  such as that estimated  by Albert 
Ando  and  Franco  Modigliani,  "The Life-cycle  Hypothesis  of Saving:  Aggregate  Implica- 
tions  and  Tests," American  Economic  Review,  vol. 53 (March  1963),  pp. 55-84, takes  the 
form  C = -qYD  + q2W.  Dividing  both  sides  by YD  yields  an  equation  for  the "consumption 
rate," approximately  one minus the saving rate that is the dependent  variable  in the 
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order  serial  correlation  and  include  both the current  and lagged  value of 
the dividend  tax preference  variable: 
(16)  SAVEPRIIYD*=  0.36-0.036NWIYD*-0.18GAP 
(0.07)  (0.010)  (0.05) 
-0.41  SHARE65  -  0.09 0(-1) 
(0.49)  (0. 10) 
+  0.03 [0 -  0(-  1)], 
(0.49) 
rho =  0.76;R2  =  0.73; Durbin-Watson  =  2.18. 
(0.12) 
The level of the dividend  tax preference  variable  is negatively  correlated 
with the private  saving  rate, although  the estimated  coefficient  is statis- 
tically  insignificant  at  conventional  levels. A 5  percentage  point  reduction 
in the dividend  tax rate, according  to this equation,  would translate  into 
roughly  a $12 billion reduction  in private saving. Equations similar  to 
equation  16  were  estimated  for  other  sample  periods.  While  the 0 variable 
had a negative coefficient in nearly all specifications, supporting  the 
view that households do not completely pierce the corporate  veil, the 
hypothesis  that  this coefficient  equals  zero could never  be rejected.  The 
coefficient  on 0(-  1) in equation 16 measures  the total effect of current 
plus lagged  shifts in the tax variable  on corporate  saving. Other  specifi- 
cations, including  only the lagged-once value of 0, provided stronger 
evidence against the null hypothesis of zero effect. The weak results 
from this specification should not be surprising  since the first-order 
autocorrelation  correction  removes  much  of the  variation  from  the slowly 
evolving  tax rate series. 
The reduced-form  approach  in equation  16  can be supplemented  with 
an alternative  testing strategy  that includes corporate  saving  as a share 
of YD*  directly  in the estimating  equation.  The results  of this approach 
are reported in table 10. The dependent variable is SAVEPRI, total 
private saving (=  CORPSAVE + PERSAVE). The estimates in the first 
t-wo  columns  correspond  to the specification: 
( YD*  )t 
Yo ?  Yi  ?y*)  +y2GAPt  (17)  ~SA  VEPRI9  3  + 74 (  YD  I 
N W 
+2A 
?  -Y3SHARE65t  ?  _Y4  YDRSAV  ?  V2t- James  M. Poterba  501 
Table 10.  Estimates of Private Saving Functions,  1948-86  and 1931-86a 
Model 1, 1948-86  Model  2, 1948-86  Model  3, 1931-86 
Ordinary  Ordinary  Ordinary 
least  Instrumental  least  Instrumental  least  Instrumental 
Independent  variable  squares  variable  squares  variable  squares  variable 
Constant  0.28  0.45  0.28  0.34  0.24  0.21 
(0.06)  (0.14)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
CORPSAVE/YD*  0.26  0.27  0.33  0.23  0.65  0.84 
(0.18)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.22)  (0.15)  (0.16) 
GAP  -0.14  -0.13  -0.13  -0.13  -0.18  -0.13 
(0.06)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
SHARE65  -0.61  -  1.98  -0.97  -  1.21  -  0.55  -  0.32 
(0.33)  (1.15)  (0.37)  (0.43)  (0.31)  (0.26) 
NW (x  10-2)IYD*  -  2.84  -  3.34  -  2.43  -  3.13  -  2.47  -  2.61 
(0.93)  (0.89)  (0.90)  (0.88)  (0.52)  (0.52) 
PENSION  SA  VINGI  YD*  ...  ...  1.36  0.87  ...  ... 
(0.89)  (0.90) 
Summary  statistic 
rho,  0.74  0.93  0.67  0.76  0.65  0.66 
(0.13)  (0.04)  (0.14)  (0. 1 1)  (0.14)  (0. 1 1) 
R2  0.73  ...  0.75  ...  0.98  ... 
Sum of squared 
residuals  1834  1833  1733  1684  5420  5078 
Durbin-Watson  2.05  2.46  2.13  2.34  1.90  2.05 
Source:  Author's  estimates  of equation  17. See text description. 
a. The dependent  variable  in each equation  is the ratio of private  saving, SAVEPRI,  to augmented  disposable 
income, YD*,  defined  as NIPA  disposable  income  plus undistributed  corporate  profits  and adjusted  by the IVA and 
CCA. Independent  variables  are: the ratio  of corporate  saving,  CORPSAVE,  to YD*;  the GNP gap;  the fraction  of 
the population  aged sixty-five  and older,  SHARE65;  and the ratio  of the stock of household  wealth  at the beginning 
of the year, NW, to YD*,  and in model  2, PENSION  SAVINGIYD*,  which  corrects  for corporate  contributions  to 
defined-benefit  pension  plans. Instrumental  variable  (IV) equations  treat CORPSAVEIYD*  as endogenous  and use 
current  and once-lagged  values  of the dividend  tax preference  variable,  ot, as instruments.  Equations  estimated  by 
ordinary  least  squares  are  corrected  for first-order  serial  correlation  and  IV equations  are  estimated  by Fair's  method, 
allowing  for first-order  autocorrelation. 
The estimates in the first column do not correct for the possible 
endogeneity of the CORPSAVE  variable, while those in the second 
column are estimated  by instrumental  variables  using 0 and 0(-  1) as 
instruments. 
The results  again  suggest that an increase in corporate  saving raises 
private  saving.  The point estimates  in the first  two columns  suggest  that 
a one dollar decline in corporate saving, measured as undistributed 
corporate  profits  with the CCA and IVA corrections, reduces private 
saving  by about 25 cents. The instrumental  variable  estimate suggests 
slightly  more offset than the uncorrected  equation. The second pair of 
equations  in this table adds the saving correction  for contributions  to 
defined-benefit  pension  plans  to the basic specification.  Inclusion  of this 
variable  does not  substantively  affect  the  point  estimates  of the corporate 502  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
saving offset, but suggests that a one dollar  increase in pension contri- 
butions  raises  private  saving  by approximately  one dollar.  Although  this 
suggests that households  may not perceive corporate  pension contribu- 
tions as saving on their behalf, the standard  errors on the pension 
adjustment  coefficient are too large for strong  conclusions. Equations 
like those in table 10 were also estimated with other components of 
corporate  saving, such as the inflationary  gain  on corporate  debt and  the 
difference  between corporate  profits  adjusted  and  unadjusted  for capital 
consumption  and inventory valuation. None of these variables had a 
statistically significant  effect on private saving, so the results are not 
reported  here. 
The last two columns  in table 10  estimate  the private  saving  function 
in equation  17  using  a longer  sample  period,  starting  in 1931  but  excluding 
the war years.59  This period  includes  both greater  variation  in corporate 
saving and more pronounced  movements in the dividend tax variable 
than the postwar period. The results support those from the shorter 
sample  in suggesting  that  changes  in corporate  saving  affect  total  private 
saving, but the effect is both substantively  and statistically  more signif- 
icant than that for the post-1948 equations. A one dollar decline in 
corporate  saving is estimated  to reduce private saving by between 65 
cents (the OLS estimates) and 84 cents (two-stage least squares esti- 
mates).  In  both  cases the  hypothesis  that  households  pierce  the corporate 
veil can be rejected  at standard  levels of significance,  and  it is difficult  to 
reject the view that a one dollar  change in corporate  saving induces an 
equally  large  change  in private  saving. 
To evaluate  the effect of corporate  on private  saving  in light of table 
10, it is important  to recognize  that  a decline in corporate  saving  affects 
private saving in two ways. First, it has a direct effect as suggested  by 
the CORPSAVE  variable.  Second, it translates  into reduced  household 
net worth,  which  will raise  private  saving,  but only by two or three  cents 
per dollar  change in net worth. Although  the net worth effect does not 
offset the direct depressing  effect of a corporate saving effect, it does 
cumulate  through  time. 
The point estimates for both the postwar and full-sample  equations 
59. The Flow of Funds  data  series  for  household  net worth  is backdated  using  the time 
series reported  in Martin  Feldstein, "Government  Deficits and Aggregate  Demand," 
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suggest  that  households  partially  pierce  the corporate  veil. In  the  postwar 
period,  the most conservative  estimates  suggest  that  a one dollar  shift  in 
corporate  saving  induces  a 23 cent shift  in private  saving. For the longer 
sample  period, the implied  effects are much larger.60  My estimate that 
the Tax Reform  Act of 1986  could lower corporate  saving  by $36  billion 
in 1989  thus suggests  that  private  saving  could  fall $10-$20  billion  a year. 
Conclusion 
The changes  in personal  and corporate  taxation  embodied  in the Tax 
Reform  Act of 1986  may  depress  corporate  saving  by more  than 1  percent 
of net national  product  by 1989. Time series evidence on personal and 
corporate saving suggests that changes in corporate saving are only 
partly  offset by opposite movements  in personal  saving. A $1 decline in 
corporate  saving is likely to result in a 25-50? decline in total private 
saving. 
These  findings  suggest  a clear  research  agenda  on the  allocative  effects 
of corporate  taxation.  If the preeminent  problem  confronting  sharehold- 
ers in their relationships with managers is preventing the profligate 
reinvestment  of free cash flow, then reducing  the dividend  tax or raising 
corporate  taxes will have desirable  incentive  effects. A higher  corporate 
tax rate provides a device for extracting  free cash flow from firms  and 
tightens  the external  capital  market's  control on new corporate  invest- 
ments. But if problems  in monitoring  managers  are less important  than 
the difficulties  that  firms  with profitable  new projects  confront  in trying 
to signal  their  opportunities  to the market,  then  tax policies that  limit  the 
availability  of internal finance exacerbate preexisting capital market 
distortions.  This  line of argument  suggests  that  the corporate  income tax 
may impose substantial  welfare costs through  its effect on corporate 
financing  decisions.  Resolving  the relative  importance  of these two views 
is a high  priority  for  future  studies  of the welfare  cost of capital  taxation. 
60. Many  studies  of whether  households  pierce  the corporate  veil that cannot  reject 
the null  hypothesis  of perfect  offset report  point  estimates  that  imply  additional  corporate 
saving  raises  total  private  saving,  often by significant  amounts.  For the task of evaluating 
the likely impact  of a reduction  in corporate  saving, calculations  based on these point 
estimates  are  of some  interest. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E.  Hall: James Poterba asks whether the financial  relations 
between  corporations  and  their  owners  have  any  influence  on  the  ultimate 
consumption  of the public.  Standard  principles  of consumption  say there 
should  be no effect-if  corporations  elect to pay the owners  later  rather 
than sooner, there should  be no change  in the present discounted  value 
of households' receipts from corporations  and therefore  no change in 
consumption. Poterba finds some evidence against this proposition, 
though  it is far  from  definitive. 
Although Poterba sees the ultimate issue as the effect of financial 
decisions upon consumption, the paper actually operates within the 
traditional  framework  of splitting saving into corporate and personal 
components  and  then  asking  if there  is complete  offset in  personal  saving 
when financial  policies change corporate  saving without  any change in 
corporate  fundamentals.  As a result, much  of the early  part  of the paper 
is the struggle  of a well-trained  economist with the elusive concept of 
saving. Poterba  follows in the footsteps of Irving  Fisher, Milton  Fried- 
man, and Franco Modigliani  in finding  that the definition  of saving is 
inherently arbitrary.  But rather than restating the question to avoid 
dealing  with saving  (the solution  adopted  by his predecessors), Poterba 
works with various  arbitrary  definitions  in spite of his full recognition  of 
their  defects. 
The most conspicuous example in the paper of the recognition  of a 
problem  of defining  saving  without  doing  anything  about  it is in the study 
of dividends without any parallel  study of share repurchases.  When a 
corporation  buys back its own stock, the effect is economically  equiva- 
lent to paying a cash dividend. However, as Poterba  explains, adding 
repurchases  to dividends is only the first step in considering  all of the 
possible asset transactions  of the corporate  sector. Because there is no 
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underlying  sharp economic principle  to apply, the research winds up 
studying  just one piece of corporate  payments  to shareholders,  namely 
dividends. 
Poterba's first approach  to the empirical  work is to define private 
saving  as the difference  between national  income and  consumption  plus 
taxes. To the extent that tax and other variables  that determine  payout 
decisions affect total private saving (corporate  plus personal), there is 
evidence that  consumers  are sensitive to payout  decisions. The hypoth- 
esis that  consumers  don't care when  payout  occurs will be rejected.  The 
direct evidence on this point, presented in equation 16, is completely 
inconclusive.  A variable  that  measures  the bias of the tax system in  favor 
of dividends  has a slightly  negative  coefficient, but the standard  error  is 
larger  than  the coefficient.  That  is, there  is weak evidence that  when the 
tax system encourages  dividend  payouts, total private  saving declines. 
The evidence is weak because the saving equation  has an unexplained 
residual  whose movements  over time have about  the same serial  corre- 
lation  as do the tax variables,  and  the two are hard  to tell apart. 
As a matter of econometrics, the reduced-form  approach  just de- 
scribed  is the right  way to test the null hypothesis of the irrelevance  of 
variables  that  influence  only the payout  policies of corporations.  Essen- 
tially  the same  test can  be carried  out  in a structural  system  where  private 
saving  is the dependent  variable  and corporate  saving  is an endogenous 
right-hand  variable, with the dividend tax bias used as an exogenous 
instrument.  Results for that test, presented  in table 10, are exactly the 
same-there is inconclusive  evidence that  payout  changes  motivated  by 
changes  in dividend  taxation  influence  total private saving. There  is no 
good  reason  to perform  both  tests, in view of their  essential  econometric 
equivalence. 
For some unexplained  reason, Poterba  carries out the second test, 
but not the first, for data starting  in 1931. The result is a conclusive 
rejection  of the hypothesis  that  saving  is invariant  to changes  in dividend 
taxation.  To the extent that Poterba  believes the results  for the Depres- 
sion-era  data, the finding  should receive much more  prominence  in the 
paper  than  it gets. 
I think Poterba's findings  would be more convincing if they were 
placed within  the more secure surroundings  of a consumption  function 
than in the questionable  environment  of a saving function. The con- 
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pared with Modigliani's  work of thirty years ago. However, I have no 
reason  to think  that  the basic conclusion  would  be any different;  a simple 
life-cycle consumption  function fitted to data starting  in 1931 would 
probably  show that consumption  is shifted upward  by a tax policy that 
encourages  the payment  of dividends  as against  the retention  of earnings 
in the firm. 
Although I am not happy with the macroeconomic specification 
adopted  by Poterba,  I see his work  as an  important  contribution  to public 
finance. The construction  of the time series data for the bias of the tax 
system with respect to dividend  payout, following sophisticated  princi- 
ples of public  finance,  is a big step forward. 
In an open economy, saving  and investment  are not locked together. 
Now that Poterba  has provided  the crucial  tax bias time series, it would 
be interesting  to extend  the search  for  effects of the tax bias  to investment 
as well as consumption.  One  could imagine  looking  at all components  of 
the GNP identity  for corporate  payout  effects. 
Another  interesting  extension of this work  would  be to examine  more 
carefully the response of the corporate sector itself to the tax bias 
variable. Two added dimensions are available: investment and share 
repurchases. In the framework of the corporate sector's cash-flow 
accounting  identity,  corporate  borrowing  could  be treated  as the  residual. 
My impression  from  table  2 is that  relatively  little of the upsurge  of share 
repurchases  can be explained  by changes  in the tax bias. 
R. Glenn  Hubbard: James  Poterba'  s excellent paper  contributes  to our 
understanding  in two areas of current research. First, despite many 
recent papers  on the effects of tax reform,  there has been little effort  to 
integrate  the effects on households  and corporations.  Second, although 
the past decade has witnessed numerous  policy attempts to increase 
total private saving, most have been directed  at household saving. The 
corporate  sector has received little attention. 
The large  share  of corporate  saving  in total private  saving  suggests at 
an intuitive  level its relevance  for policy analysis. The size of corporate 
saving  is not the issue, of course. As a matter  of theory,  it is not generally 
the case that  one can analyze  the effects of tax policies on national  saving 
by considering  separately  the effects on  individual  components  of saving. 
Poterba's  paper outlines well these issues and tries to account for and 
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study provides a much-needed  first step in reexamining  the sensitivity 
of corporate  financial  behavior  as a whole to tax policy. 
By my reading,  the paper  is organized  around  four questions: 
-How  do we measure  corporate  saving? 
-Do  taxes "matter"  in empirical  dividend  models? 
-How  do the recent tax reforms  affect corporate  saving? 
-How  sheer  is the corporate  veil? 
I will organize my comments by question, emphasizing  directions  for 
future  theoretical  and empirical  work  that might  sharpen  the analysis  of 
the policy questions  posed in the paper. 
The first table of Poterba's  paper illustrates  the quantitative  impor- 
tance of corporate saving. Even if capital markets were perfect and 
household  and corporate  saving decisions were completely linked, the 
size of corporate  saving  suggests  that  its response  to tax reform,  directed 
at either households or businesses, cannot be ignored. Issues of mea- 
surement of household saving have traditionally  been of concern to 
public  finance  economists. Poterba  demonstrates  the importance  of two 
adjustments  to official published measures of corporate saving-the 
treatment  of corporate  pension  contributions  and  revaluations  of nominal 
claims  in the presence of inflation.  As noted  in table  2 of the paper,  these 
adjustments  are substantial,  particularly  during the 1970s, mitigating 
some of the supposed decline in corporate  saving. The calculation  of 
sources of the decline in corporate  saving is useful, with the principal 
culprit  being  a decline in pretax  corporate  profitability. 
Poterba  also provides a useful summary  of prevailing  views of how 
tax policy affects  the distribution  of corporate  profits  between  dividends 
and retained  earnings.  All three views outlined-tax-irrelevance, tax- 
capitalization  (the "new view" in the public finance literature), and 
traditional-are incomplete explanations  of why individuals  hold divi- 
dend-paying  securities  despite their substantial  tax disadvantages.  The 
first  view assumes that the marginal  investor is tax-exempt,  but fails to 
explain why taxable investors hold dividend-paying  securities.' The 
1. There is some empirical  evidence that clientele effects are very weak. Marshall 
Blume  and  Irwin  Friend  have  found  that  portfolios  of institutions  show  approximately  the 
same dividend  yield as the market  as a whole, despite the very low (or zero) tax rate 
applicable  to institutions.  Marshall  E. Blume  and  Irwin  Friend,  "Institutional  Investors: 
A Rapidly Growing Presence, " in NASDAQ,  The NASDAQ Handbook: The StockMarket 
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second view just assumes that  dividends  are the vehicle for distributing 
cash to shareholders  on the margin.2  The so-called traditional  view 
assumes  that,  for  reasons  either  unstated  or specific  to individual  models, 
dividend payments are valued by shareholders.  At the most general 
level, this view has empirical  promise only if an explanation  for why 
companies  pay dividends  can be provided. 
Several explanations  of why investors might have a preference  for 
dividends  over retained  earnings  have been offered,  including  a need for 
current  income  by some investors, signaling,  and  agency  considerations 
having to do with the need to place limits on managers'  discretion in 
making  investments. The first makes little sense except in the case of 
very large transactions  costs. Standard  signaling  models see dividends 
as a response to information  gaps between insiders (managers)  and 
outsiders  (shareholders):  dividends  signal  favorable  insider  information. 
As an  empirical  matter,  such  models  must  confront  evidence  that  smaller, 
rapidly  growing  firms,  for which  the information  gap  problem  is presum- 
ably most severe, have lower payout ratios on average  than do larger, 
mature companies.' 
"Agency" benefits provide an intuitive explanation for dividend 
payments: firms will pay dividends until the marginal  benefit is just 
matched by the tax cost. The substantial  cross-sectional variation  in 
payout rates must still be confronted, though. One possibility is that 
paying dividends is more costly for some firms than others. Recent 
research on imperfections  in markets  for equity and debt emphasizes 
that all firms  do not have the same access to external  capital  markets.4 
2. Telling  evidence  of the importance  in  recent  years  of share  repurchases  and  mergers 
for cash is presented  by Poterba  and in recent work by John Shoven. John B. Shoven, 
"The Tax Consequences  of Share  Repurchases  and  Other  Non-Dividend  Cash  Payments 
to Equity Owners," in Lawrence  H. Summers,  ed., Tax  Policy and the Economy  (MIT 
Press, 1987),  pp. 29-54. 
3. See the evidence in Steven Fazzari, R. Glenn Hubbard,  and Bruce C. Petersen, 
"Financing Constraints  and Corporate  Investment," Working  Paper 2389 (National 
Bureau  of Economic  Research,  September  1987). 
4.  When firms and potential investors have asymmetric  information  about firms' 
prospects,  it is possible that some sources of external  finance  may have higher  costs or 
even be completely  unavailable  to certain  categories  of firms.  Where  managers  act in the 
interest of existing shareholders  and have superior  information  (relative to potential 
shareholders)  about the true value of the firm's existing assets and new investment 
opportunities,  one can  show  that  some  positive-net-present-value  projects  will  be rejected. 
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For firms  that face constraints  in their ability  to raise funds externally, 
dividend and investment decisions will not be independent. For such 
firms, the payment of an extra dollar of dividends has an additional 
shadow cost representing  investment displaced. These firms pay out 
less, not because they are less subject  to the agency problems  to which 
Poterba  alludes, but because the marginal  cost of paying  dividends  can 
substantially  exceed the cost arising  solely from  tax disadvantages. 
An alternative  description of the traditional  view would make the 
after-tax  rate of return, p, depend positively on the payout of the free 
cash flow (cash flow less investment) rather  than on that of earnings. 
Such a rearrangement  would reconcile low payout  rates  for firms  facing 
financing  constraints  (whose free cash flows may be roughly  zero) and 
high  payout rates for mature  firms  lacking  profitable  investment  oppor- 
tunities  on the margin.  Dividend  taxes will still affect the cost of capital 
in the way Poterba  describes. 
The time series study of the effect of tax policy on payout is an 
important  contribution  of the paper.  Since  John  Lintner'  s seminal  study, 
time series studies have been used to evaluate the determinants  of 
dividend  payout, though analyses of the effects of taxation have been 
rare.5  Indeed, most such empirical  studies have implicitly  assumed  that 
target  payout  ratios  are  independent  of changes  in  personal  and  corporate 
income tax rates. As Poterba notes, since the 1930s there has been 
substantial  time series variation  in tax rates affecting  payout  policy. 
and  Investment  Decisions  When  Firms  Have Information  That  Investors  Do Not Have," 
Journal of Financial Economics,  vol. 13  (June  1984),  pp. 187-221. 
The intuition  is in the spirit  of standard  "market  for lemons" models. If "good" firms 
and "lemons" cannot be distinguished,  new shareholders  will demand  a higher  return 
from good firms to cover losses incurred  from inadvertently  funding  lemons. If this 
premium  exceeds the share  of the value of a new project  going to existing shareholders, 
new shares  will not be issued. For young  firms  with short  track  records,  the probability  of 
purchasing  shares  of a lemon is undoubtedly  high. As firms  mature,  information  asym- 
metries  diminish  and  the lemons  discount  falls. 
Debt securities  may be subject  to similar  problems.  In general,  the cost of debt will 
increase  with  the extent of borrowing.  The precise  relationship  between  the quantity  and 
shadow  price  of credit  is likely  to vary  across  firms  according  to information  imperfections. 
For example,  asymmetric  information  between  borrowers  and  lenders  can lead  to "credit 
rationing"  to some categories  of borrowers.  In addition,  the importance  of borrower  net 
worth  (internal  finance)  has  been stressed  by many  authors. 
5. John Lintner, "The Distribution  of Incomes of Corporations  among Dividends, 
Retained  Earnings,  and  Taxes," American Economic Review,  vol. 46 (May 1956, Papers 
and Proceedings,  1955), pp. 97-113. 510  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
The error-correction  model that Poterba employs in his empirical 
work on dividends  is convenient  for evaluating  jointly the determinants 
of the target  level of dividends  and  the speed with  which  deviations  from 
that target  are corrected.  The difficulty  is that we lack a clear theory of 
either  part. Given this problem,  it is by no means obvious what model 
specification is appropriate  here. Some additional comments on the 
implied dynamics, as well as comments on the results of alternative 
specifications, would be useful. Why, for example, need the error 
correction be symmetric? Would managers  increase dividends when 
they fell below target faster than they would reduce an above-normal 
level of dividends? One alternative  approach  would be to model the 
payout rate-rather than the level of dividends-as  depending  on 0. In 
such a framework,  the percentage  increase  in dividends  associated with 
a given percentage  increase  in earnings  would no longer  be independent 
of the tax parameter. 
The estimation results appear  to corroborate  a strong tax effect on 
dividend  payout. Even though  much  of the variation  in the data occurs 
before the Second World War, the coefficients on the tax variables 
reported  in table 5 have the right sign and are in most cases precisely 
estimated.  As I have indicated,  though,  interpretation  for  policy analysis 
is difficult. 
Particularly  striking  is the result  in table 6 about  the effect on payout 
of the Undistributed  Profits  Tax of 1936-37. This policy experiment,  in 
which  funds  were distributed  from  the corporate  sector to the household 
sector, is particularly  relevant for evaluating  asymmetric-information 
models that stress the importance  of net worth  positions  for investment. 
A useful extension would be to analyze the impact  of the undistributed 
profits  tax on dividends  using firm  data from the period. In the context 
of the capital  market  imperfections  I discussed earlier,  it is possible that 
the tax could depress investment in constrained  firms. Contemporary 
chroniclers  discussed the impact  of the tax on investment  and economic 
activity.6 
Since Tobin's  q incorporates  the market's  expectation  of future  after- 
tax dividends, it might be an important  predictor  of dividend payout, 
especially if managers try to  adjust dividend payments relative to 
6.  See,  for example,  George  E.  Lent,  The Impact  of the  Undistributed Profits  Tax, 
1936-1937  (Columbia  University  Press, 1948). James  M. Poterba  511 
permanent  earnings.  In the reduced-form  equation,  the expected effect 
is not obvious  a priori.  Cross-sectionally,  one might  imagine  that  capital- 
constrained  firms  have  high  q values  and  low dividend  payouts;  similarly, 
mature  firms  in declining  industries  may  have high  payout  rates  with low 
q values (reflecting  a lack of new investment  opportunities). 
The third question addressed by Poterba is the impact of the Tax 
Reform  Act of 1986  on corporate  payout. Such effects are  interesting  for 
policy purposes  if households respond  less than completely to changes 
in corporate  saving. Poterba  notes that if managers  resist cutting divi- 
dends after the Tax Reform  Act takes effect, corporate  saving will be 
reduced by more than his empirical estimates would predict. If the 
provisions of the new law are expected to be permanent,  it is hard to 
imagine  why shareholders  would react severely to such cuts, provided 
that  managers  were at the optimal  payout  level previously.  The  projected 
declines  in corporate  saving  during  1987-91  are substantial.  The agency 
arguments  emphasized  by Poterba  make  it clear  that some of the decline 
will  be due  to lower  levels of wasteful  managerial  investment.  Of  concern, 
however, is the effect of the tax changes on firms that must rely on 
internal  finance  as their  primary  source of investment  funds. 
The remainder  of the paper confronts directly the issue of links 
between  personal  and  corporate  saving.  While  it is true  that  high-income 
individuals,  who receive most of the dividends and capital gains, are 
unlikely  to be liquidity-constrained,  an increase  in the level of corporate 
taxation compensated by a reduction in personal taxes redistributes 
resources from shareholders  to less affluent individuals, whose con- 
sumption  is more  likely to be constrained  by current  resources. It would 
be interesting  to examine  potential  effects on consumption  of such a tax 
policy given plausible  estimates of the importance  of constrained  con- 
sumers  in the economy. 
As  Poterba notes, there are good reasons to  believe,  based on 
consideration  of agency  and  asymmetric  information,  that  dividends  and 
retained  earnings  may be valued differently  by shareholders.  The cases 
he discusses can be couched within the framework  I outlined earlier. 
Suppose that dividends are paid until, on the margin,  agency benefits 
from dividend  payments are equal to the tax cost of paying dividends 
plus the shadow value of investment crowded out by the payment of 
dividends.  For mature  companies  facing no capital  market  constraints, 
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distributions  may be taken  as a sign of wasteful investment,  making  the 
firm  vulnerable  to acquisition  by outsiders  who will replace  the current 
management.  Poterba's  argument  that  higher  corporate  taxes will not be 
fully reflected in equity values since they will be financed in part by 
lower levels of managerial  waste ignores the potential importance  of 
takeovers in disciplining  wasteful  investment. 
In constrained  companies,  for which the shadow value of a marginal 
investment is high, dividend payouts are likely to be low. For firms 
facing  financing  constraints,  an increase  in corporate  tax burdens  has an 
unambiguously  negative  effect  on investment  and  growth,  and  the  decline 
in share values induced  by a one dollar  increase in current  tax burdens 
will be greater  than  one dollar.  While  this scenario  applies  to many  firms, 
more empirical  work is needed to determine  its relevance  for aggregate 
movements  in corporate  saving. I do, however, agree  with Poterba  that 
complete piercing  of the corporate  veil would be extremely surprising 
on a priori  grounds. 
In taking  up empirical  issues in estimating  offsets in personal  saving 
to changes in corporate  saving, Poterba  notes that "the net effect of a 
revenue-neutral  [tax] reform  [on private saving] depends on the distri- 
bution of equity ownership and the magnitude  of the differences in 
consumption  propensities." Some illustrative  calculations  along these 
lines would aid interpretation  of the empirical  results  that  follow. 
Interpretation  of the empirical  work  estimating  the impact  of changes 
in corporate  saving  on household  saving  would  be more  straightforward 
if a consumption model were used; difficulties  of addressing  what is 
meant by household saving would then be avoided. Even then, offset 
estimates are not sufficient  to distinguish  the two views summarized  by 
Poterba of why redistributing  funds from the corporate sector to the 
household  sector  might  have  real  effects. Consider,  for  example,  a policy 
change in which the average tax burden of the corporate sector is 
increased, compensated by a reduction in personal tax burdens. A 
finding that household saving responds less than dollar for dollar to 
changes in corporate  saving could be consistent either with a positive 
wealth effect from reduced managerial  waste or with the presence of a 
minority  of households whose consumption  is sensitive to changes in 
after-tax  income. What  is needed in addition  is a model  of investment  to 
investigate whether the level of investment is independent  of the allo- 
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to shareholders.  In all fairness, such an effort  is beyond  the scope of this 
paper. 
Within  the context of the model  Poterba  actually  employs, the idea of 
using tax shocks to study the reactions of households to changes in 
corporate  saving  is a good one; it is important  to consider  the effects of 
exogenous  variation in corporate saving. One must be careful here, 
though,  since changes  in corporate  and  personal  tax rates, which would 
affect  personal  saving, are  often explicitly  linked  in policy actions. I will 
withhold obvious quibbles about the reduced-form  character of the 
approach,  since the results  give us a broad  overview of the likely size of 
offsets in personal  saving  to changes in corporate  saving. The inclusion 
of the net worth  variable  complicates  interpretation  of the results;  some 
changes  in tax policy parameters  presumably  affect share  values and  net 
worth, leading to a further effect on households' consumption. In 
addition,  given  the incorporation  of a net  worth  variable,  why not include 
adjustments  for social security wealth? These qualifications  notwith- 
standing, the offset results presented are suggestive and provide an 
impetus  to investigate  channels  through  which  less than  complete  offsets 
result, particularly  with respect to the potential  role of households  and 
firms  whose decisions must  be made  in imperfect  capital  markets. 
In conclusion, I believe that Poterba's paper is an important  step 
toward  modeling  the impact  of corporate  tax policy on corporate  saving 
and investment. Policies designed to alter corporate saving must not 
lose sight of considerations  of agency and asymmetric  information  in 
capital markets, which link real and financial  decisions. I agree with 
Poterba  that  understanding  these considerations  may  alter  substantially 
our thoughts  about the macroeconomic  and efficiency effects of taxes 
on capital  income. 
General  Discussion 
William  Nordhaus  commended  Poterba  for examining  the impact  of 
the Tax Reform  Act of 1986  on the corporate  sector. Most analysts of 
the reform,  he noted, had neglected  corporations  and failed  to integrate 
the corporate  and  personal  sectors when examining  the outcome of the 
new policy. By considering  the effect of the corporate  tax on corporate 
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paper  filled an important  gap. Nordhaus  then turned  to the issue of the 
treatment of pensions. He agreed with Poterba that it is difficult to 
measure  accurately  the liabilities  of corporations  corresponding  to their 
obligation  to pay  future  pensions. Nevertheless, he argued,  the approach 
taken in the paper, measuring  corporate  saving  by corporate  contribu- 
tions to defined-benefit  plans as if there were no accrual  of obligations, 
can give a badly mistaken  picture. He noted, moreover, that over the 
past fifteen years corporate  contributions  have changed  in response to 
legislative initiatives, for example the Employee Retirement  Income 
Security  Act of 1974  (ERISA), that have mandated  a particular  level of 
funding  for pension plans without a corresponding  change in pension 
fund liabilities. Such influences bias conclusions about the trend in 
corporate  saving,  preventing  corporate  saving  from  declining  even more 
than  it did. 
Based upon the evidence in table 4, Martin  Baily commented that 
the appropriate  question now is "Why is it that corporations  used to 
pay dividends, whereas now they use share repurchases to a much 
greater  extent?" He suggested  that  corporations  may have finally  heard 
the message of economists and realized that share repurchases are 
preferable  to dividends  as a way to distribute  earnings  to shareholders. 
He wondered  what  caused  the change.  Poterba  suggested  that  one cause 
was simply a change in the perception  of managers  as to the available 
options. For many years, managers  believed that share repurchases 
would be treated  as dividends  and  taxed accordingly.  Repurchases  by a 
number of prominent firms in the early 1980s proved them wrong. 
Poterba added that tax changes have little to do with the increase in 
share  repurchases. 
Joseph Pechman  reminded  the panel  that the long-term  impact  of the 
Tax Reform  Act of 1986  cannot be assessed without  understanding  the 
incidence of the new law. He argued,  contrary  to the approach  taken in 
the paper, that the Tax Reform  Act of 1986  should  not be regarded  as a 
general tax increase on all corporations. In fact, he noted, it would 
reduce  taxes on the typical  corporation  in the manufacturing  and service 
sectors and increase them on selected industries, such as defense and 
financial  services. Pechman  reasoned  that, in the long run, the increase 
in the tax burden on defense contractors  would be passed on to the 
government, thereby reducing saving in the federal sector, while the 
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Poterba's calculations of the ultimate effect of the new tax law on 
dividends  and saving  could thus be misleading. 
William Brainard  wondered where the increase in dividends that 
Poterba  predicts in response to a tax increase would come from. For 
given before-tax corporate  profits, increased dividends have to come 
from some combination  of greater  corporate  borrowing,  increased  sale 
of equities, and  a decrease  in investment.  Which  of these bears  the brunt 
of the adjustment  makes a major  difference to the assessment of the 
long-run  consequences of the tax change  to the economy. 